Table 2: Specific features of pre-reform periods in equation (1)
|
impact of dummy for reform | |||||
|
Dependent variable |
labour market________ |
I financial sector |
tax policy___________ |
product market | |
|
______________________________________deficit and debt______________________________________ | |||||
|
NLGXQ |
0.23, -0.25 (0.51) |
0.33, 0.46 (0.40) |
0.30, 0.80 (0.45)* |
0.22, 0.54 (0.45) | |
|
NLGXQA______ |
0.24, -0.09 (0.44) |
0.29, 0.14 (0.36) |
0.29,1.33 (0.41)*** |
0.24, 0.81 (0.39)** | |
|
DEBT_________ |
0.56, 3.59 (2.44) |
0.48, -1.38 (2.27) |
0.65, 3.50 (2.34) |
0.56, 3.08 (2.22) | |
|
_____________________________________expenditures_____________________________________ | |||||
|
YPGXQ |
0.38, 0.60 (0.51) |
0.34, -0.23 (0.41) |
0.38, 0.57 (0.46) |
0.39, 0.22 (0.44) | |
|
YPGXQA______ |
0.34, 0.44 (0.41) |
0.30, -0.13 (0.34) |
0.31, -0.03 (0.37) |
0.35, -0.13 (0.36) | |
|
SSPGQ_________ |
0.47, 0.46 (0.28)* |
0.43, -0.16 (0.22) |
0.53,0.48 (0.023)** |
0.48, 0.13 (0.23) | |
|
______________________________________revenues_______________________________________ | |||||
|
YRGTQ |
0.44, 0.35 (0.46) |
0.40, -0.02 (0.38) |
0.44,1.79 (0.41)*** |
0.44, 0.33 (0.41) | |
|
YRGQA_______ |
0.41, 0.28 (0.45) |
0.37, -0.20 (0.38) |
0.42,1.74 (0.41)*** |
0.41, 0.30 (0.39) | |
|
TYQ__________ |
0.18, -0.00 (0.27) |
0.21, 0.02 (0.22) |
0.22,0.86 (0.24)*** |
0.19, 0.36 (0.23) | |
|
TYQA________ |
0.18, -0.07 (0.26) |
0.20, -0.10 (0.21) |
0.20,0.84 (0.24)*** |
0.18, 0.28 (0.22) | |
|
_____________________________business cycle/labour market_____________________________ | |||||
|
GROWTH |
0.29, 0.00 (0.00)* |
0.29, 0.00 (0.00) |
0.32, -0.01 (0.00)* |
0.28, -0.00 (0.00) | |
|
Growthfddv |
0.21, 1.42 (0.47)*** |
0.20, 0.51 (0.34) |
0.23, -0.64 (0.39) |
0.19, -0.85 (0.40)** | |
|
outputgap |
0.31, 0.11 (0.45) |
0.34, 0.45 (0.32) |
0.35, -0.16 (0.36) |
0.32, -0.76 (0.37)** | |
|
UNEMPLOYMENT |
0.44, 0.63 (0.36)* |
0.41, 0.05 (0.28) |
0.50, 0.55 (0.32)* |
0.46, 0.27 (0.30) | |
|
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT |
0.32, -0.22 (0.17) |
0.36, -0.13 (0.13) |
0.36,0.42 (0.15)*** |
0.32, -0.03 (0.14) | |
|
___________________________consumer confidence/spending___________________________ | |||||
|
CCONFST |
0.29, 0.56 (0.19)*** |
0.35, 0.05 (0.16) |
0.30, -0.39 (0.19)** |
0.27,-0.44(0.16)*** | |
|
SRATIO________ |
0.25, 0.10 (0.57) |
0.28, 0.54 (0.48) |
0.39, -0.84 (0.47)* |
0.20, -0.01 (0.51) | |
|
Growthcpv |
0.19, 1.16 (0.41)*** |
0.18, 0.16 (0.31) |
0.21, -0.58 (0.35)* |
0.18, -0.45 (0.35) | |
|
Growthihv |
0.16, 4.98 (1.88)*** |
0.14, 2.42 (1.43)* |
0.12, -1.35 (1.71) |
0.12, 0.22 (1.73) | |
|
____________________________business confidence/investment____________________________ | |||||
|
Busconfst |
0.42, 0.43 (0.21)** |
0.40, 0.37 (0.18)** |
0.38, -0.42 (0.19)** |
0.40, -0.03 (0.17) | |
|
Growthibv |
0.26, 2.81 (1.50)* |
0.26, 1.02 (1.11) |
0.34, -2.08 (1.23)* |
0.25, -2.28 (1.25)* | |
*, **, ***: significant at 10 %, 5 %, 1 % level respectively
For deficits the testing indicates that there are no significantly different overall budgetary
conditions on the eve of labour and financial market reforms compared to other periods. Contrary
to that, deficits tend to be significantly lower in periods preceding product market and tax
reforms. For example, the cyclically adjusted deficit is 1.3 percent of GDP lower in periods before
tax reforms are taking place compared to all other periods. The high significance in case of tax
reforms is hardly surprising: Budgetary leeway is helpful to initiate legislation aiming at reducing
tax distortions.
The separate look into both sides of the budgets does only bring about few but revealing
significant results: social spending is significantly up prior to labour market and tax reform and
tax revenues are up prior to tax reforms.
144
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