rights on the other hand as well as (iii) the distinction between positive and negative rights.24
While acknowledging the importance of this (theoretical) discussion on the nature of rights, it is
not taken up here as it does not influence the argument of this paper. I define rights, for the pur-
pose of the paper, as legally recognized interests which are to be found on a continuum from
individual to collective interests.25 None of the described categorizations of rights mentioned
above capture this dimension. To clarify the argument, one might imagine the right to life, which
is based on a purely individual interest and the right to self-determination, which is based on a
right which bundles individual interests to a collective interest.26 The collective good character is
greater for rights with a collective aspect: If all the (normatively relevant) benefit is with the in-
dividual, there is no collective good element in effectively defending the right, whereas if others
are violated simultaneously by the nature of the right (e.g. self-determination), the individual
complaint conveys a benefit to all of them. In that case, the right per se already possesses an in-
herent public good aspect. Further examples are religious-freedom type rights which may be
conceived as rights with individual aspects, such as the right of freedom to worship but may have
collective interest aspects as well, such as the interest of a religious group in maintaining respect
for its holy sites. Furthermore, there are several (individual) rights which can only be exercised
collectively: democracy (i.e. the right to vote27), freedom of assembly and association, and mi-
nority rights. Especially minority rights can to a large extent only be exercised collectively, such
as the right to speak one’s own language, schooling in one’s own language, and participating in
cultural life. The same applies e.g. for landuse rights of indigenous people, who usually even
own those rights collectively.28 But even if a purely individual right, such as the right to physical
integrity of an individual, is under consideration, most often these too are de facto not restricted
to one individual, rather extend to many others in the same factual situation, as in the case of
industrial pollution,29 or noise from airports30 and all systemic or large-scale violations. Thus,
24 See Karel Vasak, “Les Différentes Typologies des Droits de L’Homme”, in: Emmanuelle Bribosia (ed.),
Classer les Droits de l’Homme, 2004, Bruxelles, 11-23 for an overview of the classifications. For the
positive/negative right distinction, see also Cordula Droge, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der
Europaischen Menschenrechtskonvention, 2003, Berlin et al., at 4-10.
25 Following Rudolf v. Jhering, Der Kampf um’s Recht, 1880, Wien, and Joseph Raz, The Morality of
Freedom, 1986, Oxford, at 181 et seq., who base their rights theory on interests.
26 Collective rights are usually defined as those rights whose beneficiary is the collectivity per se rather than its
individual members. They are rights which can be exercised by a group itself. See Harriet Ketley, “Exclusion
by Definition: Access to International Tribunals for the Enforcement of the Collective Rights of Indigenous
People”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 8 (2001), 331-368, at 331, and Rainer
Hofmann, “Minority Rights: Individual or Group Rights? A Comparative View on European Legal Systems”,
German Yearbook of International Law 40 (1997), 356-382, at 359.
27 See for example the right to vote of Turkish Cypriots, Case of Aziz v. Cyprus (Appl. No. 69949/01), Eur.
Ct.H.R. Judgment of 22 June 2004, available at:
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&key=35547&portal=hbkm&source=external&tabl
e=285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49>.
28 Group rights or minority rights are usually associated with ethnic or cultural characteristics and thus
oftentimes with territorial rights and regional autonomy, which makes them politically so delicate. It is not
the intention here to address those issues. For the purpose of the argument, it suffices to acknowledge that
certain interest may be de iure or de facto only awarded to a group.
29 See Case of Lopez Ostra v. Spain (Appl No. 16798/90), Judgment of 09 December 1994, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
41 (1995), Case of Guerra and others v. Italy (Appl No. 14967/89), Judgment of 19 February 1998, 1998-I,
No. 64 Eur. Ct. H.R at 210, where the right to information in environmental issues was granted the first time
and Case of Oneryildiz v. Turkey (Appl. No. 48939/99), Eur. Ct.H.R. Judgment of Grand Chamber of 30.
Nov. 2004, available at: