(2) The expected compliance of the respondent state enters as well into the calculus of a potential
complainant.19 Therefore, the probability of compliance with the decision needs to be taken into
account: this depends on the binding nature of the decision (including the binding nature in the
respective national law) and the means to supervise compliance with the judgment. It may make
a difference if compliance monitoring is done by a political body or by the judicial body itself.
As a rule, it can be hypothesized that the better the monitoring and enforcement system, the
greater the incentive to bring a complaint. Institutional provisions for monitoring and enforcing
the execution of judgments certainly merit further research, but cannot be dealt with here, as the
focus lies on the legal institutions providing access to human rights bodies.
(3) The general framing of the decisions, that is, the way judicial bodies formulate the duty of the
respondent state in the operative part of the judgment may be important for a potential complain-
ant. Judicial bodies can only declare violations, may include damages or may encompass more or
less general measures the state has to take, including the challenging of national statutes or prac-
tices. Generally speaking, it can be hypothesized that if there are reparations to be paid for the
violation found or precise measures to be taken (such as a release from prison), this will be con-
ducive to claims. The higher the reparations or the more precise the dictum, the more likely a
complaint will be brought.20
(4) The expected length of the proceedings may be important as “justice delayed is justice de-
nied” - to cite an old saying. Thus, a potential complainant will take the length of the proceed-
ings into account.
(5) The composition of the judicial body may be of importance. If, e.g., the complainant consid-
ers that the proceedings are political or that the members do not understand the nature of viola-
tions in specific countries, she may be less inclined to complain. Here, it is assumed that this
does not play a great role in comparison with having the possibility of review of a national hu-
man rights infringement.
(6) In important parts of the world, the fear of negative consequences or repercussions for a
named victim or her lawyers inflicted by state authorities may be taken into account if the indi-
vidual victim is named.21 Those expected consequences amount to non-monetary expected costs.
19 Nevertheless, the complainant might be satisfied with the declaration of „injustice“ by an international body.
Therefore, it can be expected that victims complain even if they do not necessarily expect compliance of the
state.
20 One might even consider introducing “punitive” damages as a penalty for systemic or especially gross
violations. See Opinion No. 209/2002 on the Implementation of the Judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 53rd Plenary Session (13-14 December 2002), Doc.
No. CDL-AD (2002) 34, available at: <www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)034-e.asp#_ftnref1>,
at para. 78 et seq., where “astreintes” (fines for delays in the performance of a legal obligation) are
considered. Nevertheless it should be noted that reparations, as all monetary compensation, may be only of
secondary importance for complainants. See e.g. Bruno Frey, Not Just for the Money. An Economic Theory
of Personal Motivation, 1997; Ernst Fehr/Armin Falk, “Psychological Foundations of Incentives”, European
Economic Review 46 (2002), 687-724.
21 See e.g. I/A Court H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies. Advisory Opinion OC-11/90
of August 10, 1990 (Series A, No. 11), at para. 32. and 35.