This article seeks to analyze the different incentives provided by individual complaint mecha-
nisms for individuals, groups or non-governmental organizations (hereinafter NGO) to make use
of international human rights bodies. More specifically, the effectiveness of human rights treaties
by means of individual complaint mechanisms will be analyzed, using a rational-choice looking
glass for incentives of individuals to bring complaints depending on the one hand on the right in
question and depending on the provisions of ius standi on the other hand. The rational-choice
approach as a social science approach allows us to address the “why-question” on the individual
level. As of yet, nothing can be found in international law and international relations literature
18
concerning that question.
From a rational-choice perspective, under what circumstances can individuals be expected to
make use of complaint mechanisms under human rights treaties? Do complaints by NGOs, class
action and actio popularis (hereafter referred to as “collective complaints”) make sense from a
rational-choice perspective? What kinds of incentives are generated for the individual by such
complaint mechanisms? How should it be evaluated from a normative standpoint that legal
mechanisms are de lege lata such as to deter human rights suits? If higher effectiveness of human
rights treaties is desirable, what kind of legal mechanisms should be suggested?
As a means of addressing such questions, this article first describes the problem theoretically, by
clarifying the relevant concepts of rights and the collective good aspect of rights as well as the
concept of ius standi. Further, the rationale of “collective complaints” is analyzed by contemplat-
ing in detail the incentive structure for individuals, groups and NGOs to bring a complaint.
Those incentives differ, depending on whether an individual right or a collective right (in a broad
sense) is infringed, and depending on what the procedural requirements and the costs of com-
plaints are in the given context (II.). A detailed analysis of the respective human rights treaties
concerning substantive provisions and standing provisions follows (III.). The different human
rights systems are analyzed from this perspective (IV.), while the final section concludes (V.).
II. Theoretical Description of the Problem
IHRL is an organic whole in its functioning. Nevertheless, one may analyze constituent parts of
it in order to draw conclusions for the potential of enhancement of the whole system. In order to
put the procedural provisions analyzed in this article into a broader contextual framework, sev-
eral variables conducive to bringing complaints are presented:
(1) Socio-economic circumstances, the rule of democracy or autocracy, educational level, gen-
eral access to the legal system and knowledge of the IHRL system are important factors. These
variables capture the general environment of potential victims and their access to the interna-
tional legal system.
18 See also Alan O’Neil Sykes, “The Economics of Public International Law”, University of Chicago Law &
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 216 (2004), at 5. B. vii, available at:
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=564383>.