Bidding for envy-freeness
749
Table 8. Players’ valuations of bundles after the second round of compensations
B4 B1 B3 B2
|
P1 |
[50 |
50 |
50 |
45 |
|
P2 |
40 |
[6Ô] |
55 |
65 |
|
P3 |
65 |
0 |
[65] |
65 |
|
P4 |
60 |
50 |
50 |
[60] |
|
30 |
0 |
40 |
25 |
Graph G~
3)
4)
1)2!4
tion all compensations must be returned, and the compensation procedure is
restarted. Note that the bid matrix after the required permutation of columns
is now given by Table 1. As we know this new assignment is utilitarian and the
compensation procedure with ex-post payments will lead to an envy-free out-
come.
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