Budzinski/Wacker: Springer-ProSiebenSat.1-Merger
16
improved multimarket contact because both conglomerates now combine TV and
print media19, but only at the expense of qualifying the incontestable one-of-a-kind
character of BILD, which, then, must be viewed under stronger competitive pressure
by other print media. Thus, on the one hand, the Bundeskartellamt argues that the
merger is anticompetitive because of the exceptional position of BILD, on the other
hand the merger is deemed anticompetitive because it makes Bertelsmann-RTLGroup
and AS-P7S1 more symmetric.
This obvious contradiction is addressed by claiming that BILD represents a fringe
competitor to the duopoly on the TV advertising market. “The Bild-Zeitung currently
represents the sole alternative - outside the relevant market - for advertisers concern-
ing TV advertisement with Bertelsmann and P7S1. To some extent there is a fringe
substitution. If AS merges with P7S1, this fringe substation is omitted. Then, P7S1
and Bertelsmann are not forced anymore to consider the prices of advertisement space
in the Bild-Zeitung when setting their prices for TV advertising, which leads to a
strengthening of the duopoly. The omission of the fringe substitution cannot be lim-
ited in effect on P7S1. These are effects that affect competition on the overall TV
advertising market and, thus, benefit the duopoly as a whole. Therefore, it cannot be
expected that the Bild-Zeitung creates an asymmetry within the duopoly, which could
impair parallel behaviour and lead to competition within the duopoly” (Bundeskar-
tellamt 2006: 39-40; our translation). Unfortunately, this reasoning cannot convince
from an economic perspective. In the first place, an empirical, preferably econometric
analysis of the substitution elasticity between TV advertising and advertising in BILD
is completely missing. The claim seems to rest on plausibility considerations, which
could have easily done the other way around. Notwithstanding, the economic theory
of two-sided markets provides indication for the existence of outside competition be-
tween two platforms (e.g. TV channels and newspapers) (Roson 2005: 149). How-
ever, even if one accepts a (weak) substitutional relation20, it remains unclear why its
erosion in the course of the merger alleviates the asymmetry. Still, concerning the
post-merger situation, one of the oligopolists possesses a unique newspaper and the
other one does not. This could entail incentives for AS-P7S1 to employ the (incon-
testable) market power of BILD to strive for the market leading position in the TV
market. With the background of a trump of the BILD calibre, why should AS-P7S1
stay satisfied with the balanced duopoly situation? Bertelsmann-RTLGroup, on the
other hand, can be expected to rationally anticipate the new situation. Why is it im-
probable that Bertelsmann-RTLGroup would react in a fiercely competitive way in
order to counter AS-P7S1-threat? Altogether, several characteristics of the case sup-
19 This entails a different problem, however. If both conglomerates became truly symmetric because
of the merger and if the competition agency prohibited the merger on these grounds, the competi-
tive advantage of Bertelsmann-RTLGroup - being the only TV-print-media conglomerate - would
be cemented by the competition agency. This could lead to the allegation of protecting competitors
instead of competition.
20
BILD is assessed as being outside the relevant market. Note that other parts of the Bundeskar-
tellamt decision view BILD and P7S1 as complementary products. See section 3.2.3.