Springer-ProSiebenSat.1-Merger
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port the possibility that the merger would create incentives for more competition on
the TV advertising market.
Interestingly enough, the Bundeskartellamt completely ignores each of these scenar-
ios. Surprisingly, it also does not analyse the possibility of a BILD-based predatory
strategy in the TV advertising market, which would represent a possible anticompeti-
tive consequence of the conglomerate merger. It is not our aim to demonstrate the
potential procompetitive character of the blocked merger, and we cannot preclude that
it does not create scope for coordinated effects. However, we do not find sufficient
economic evidence in the Bundeskartellamt decision to justify its verdict.
3.2 Cross-media Strategies, Leveraging, and Bundling
The analysis of the reader and advertising market for newspapers focuses on various
possibilities of cross-media strategies as an industry-specific consequence of a con-
glomerate merger including different media markets. Albeit the proposed merger does
not lead to a strengthening of dominant position in anyone of the affected markets, it
may enable discrimination and bundling strategies, causing anticompetitive leverage
effects across markets (see section 2.2). In its detailed documentation, the Bundeskar-
tellamt (2006: 41-66) distinguishes three types of (allegedly) anticompetitive cross-
media strategies: (a) price-discrimination in cross-media advertising, (b) content-
related cross-promotion, and (c) cross-media advertising campaigns.
3.2.1 Price-Discrimination in Cross-media Advertising
Concerning the reader market for newspapers, the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 51-53) is
concerned that special offers, lower spot prices or corporate discounts by the TV sta-
tions of P7S1 in favour of BILD would further stabilise the newspaper`s already un-
challenged dominant position. Taking into account opportunity costs, one might ques-
tion, however, whether such a price discrimination represents a favourable strategy
for the stations (Moschel 2005; Kuchinke/Schubert 2006). Economically, the signifi-
cance of opportunity costs sensitively depends on capacity limits in such cases. If
P7S1 has free capacities or the ability to fill up advertising time slots not demanded
by third parties on short notice with spots for BILD, then anticompetitive concerns
might be justified. The capacity issue was subjected to controversy between the par-
ties with the Bundeskartellamt (2006: 52) stressing the availability of low-opportunity
cost capacities for cross-media advertising. The overall media presence of the
Springer media could further be enhanced by means of product placement in various
TV shows, which is expected to be further facilitated by a new EU directive
(Bundeskartellamt 2006: 53). In return the TV stations could also take advantage of
the wide circulation of BILD to promote their program.
However, next to the supply-side analysis of capacities, a demand-side analysis is
needed. Given the already extremely dominant position and ubiquitous presence of