The name is absent



CONCLUSIONS

In this papera model has been developedwhichexp lores the long- runePects
cfinccme and wealth inequality via capital market imperfections apecting
both human capitaland physicalcapitalinvestment. Thedynamicpatterns
arediπ erent acccrdi ng to the economy's structu ra l parameters and acccrdi ng
to types ofirrtergenieratio:nal transmission ofthe technical inetαency D y
namics can be eitherergodic ornon-ergodic, with long-run social mobility
orimmobility. The higherthe inheritability ofentrepreneurialskills and the
higherthe individualaltruism, the more plausible intergenerationalincome
and wealth persistence. Sons'occupation, wealth and income are non- lower
than fathers' ones. In this case multiple equilibria are possible and there-
fore long-run distribution may depend on initialconditions: the higherthe
non-qμaii..ed share^progenitors thehigherthe long-run shareofpopuIa
tion which is trapped into poverty and non-qμaii...cation. T he decrease of
individualaltruism forces a greatershare ofthe population intopoverty and
non-quali.cation. M oreover, forparticulareconomy's structuralparameters,
the whole population almostconverges to unique occupation (non-quali.ed
workers) and toa unique lowwealth in the long-run, whateverthe technical
inet de∏cy transmission hypothesis.

Iftechnical inetdency has also a stochastic component there always
exists socialmobility. Long run distributions may be ergodic ornot. The
total stodhastidty oftechnical inet dency mayeitherbe a way outora con-
demnation to poverty and to non-quali.cation, according to the economy's
structuralparameters.

T he results may give a rationιalefcrdiπ ercntdross-dcuntr^cs dynamics of
wealth distribution as faras multiple equilibria are obtained. One country
may converge to a high level of wealth with the whole population highly
quali.ed, whileanother, becauseofits worseinitialcondition(highlyunequal
wealth distribution and low average wealth), may be trapped into poverty
and intonon quali.cation. M oreoverthe modelmay explain socialmobility,
since changes in occupational classes may be both the cause and the e ect
ofthe accumulation. In particularthe modelcan provide a rationale forthe
familiar determinants ofsocialmobility. Ifskills areinheritableand incomes
areskill-dependent, sons'income is related tothe fathers'one. A nalogously,
the more fathers bequeath their sons, the more sons' income and wealth
destiny is downward rigid. In otherwords a high altruism implies upward
mobility between income, wealth and occupationalclasses.

30



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