XREAP2007-14
TABLES
Table 1. Fiscal rule, (1) and (6), general government.
|
US________________ |
Germany | |||||||
|
1962-2000_______________ |
1971-2005_______________ |
1971-1990______________ |
1991-2005______________ | |||||
|
(1) |
(6) |
(1) |
(6) |
(1) |
(6) |
(1) |
(6) | |
|
ρ |
0.06 |
0.05 |
0.01 |
0.14 |
0.01 |
0.21 |
0.14 |
0.15 |
|
(0.02) |
(0.03) |
(0.69) |
(0.06) |
(0.95) |
(0.29) |
(0.14) |
(0.15) | |
|
α |
- |
0.14 |
- |
-0.81 |
- |
-0.12 |
- |
-0.26 |
|
(0.12) |
(0.06) |
(0.27) |
(0.74) | |||||
|
obs |
38 |
-38 |
"35 |
^35 |
20 |
~20 |
15 |
∏5 |
|
R2 |
0.17 |
0.20_________ |
0.07________ |
0.13_________ |
0.01 |
0.08________ |
0.18 |
0.19________ |
|
1967 |
1991 |
1982 |
1976 |
- |
- |
- |
- | |
|
AQ |
(0.08) |
(0.27) |
(0.30) |
(0.25) | ||||
|
AP |
(0.03) |
(0.21) |
(0.29) |
(0.17) | ||||
|
Bai |
1966 |
1994 |
1983 |
1981 | ||||
|
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.00) | |||||
|
[-;-]____________ |
[-;-] |
[1976;2000] |
[1979;1983] | |||||
Notes: coefficients are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust OLS estimates; AQ and AP indicate
the p-values for the corrected Andrews Quandt and Andrews Ploberger break date for the fiscal rule; Bai is
the breaktest of Bai (1997), with its p-value and 33% confidence interval; for the specification for
Germany, a shift dummy and time trend is included since 1991 for the full sample estimates.
Table 2. Fiscal rules for government tiers, system estimates (3), US states, 1963-2000.
|
state___________ |
ρ_______ |
p-value_______ |
state___________ |
P_______ |
p-value_______ |
|
federal________ |
0.03__________ |
(0.13) | |||
|
AK |
0.27 |
(0.01) |
MT |
0.07 |
(0.00) |
|
AL |
0.02 |
(0.01) |
NC |
0.03 |
(0.00) |
|
AR |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
ND |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
|
AZ |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
NE |
0.08 |
(0.00) |
|
CA |
0.03 |
(0.02) |
NH |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
|
CO |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
NJ |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
|
CT |
0.01 |
(0.22) |
NM |
0.03 |
(0.10) |
|
DC |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
NV |
0.02 |
(0.09) |
|
DE |
0.07 |
(0.00) |
NY |
0.04 |
(0.01) |
|
FL |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
OH |
0.08 |
(0.00) |
|
GA |
0.03 |
(0.00) |
OK |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
|
HI |
0.05 |
(0.01) |
OR |
0.08 |
(0.00) |
|
IA |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
PA |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
|
ID |
0.07 |
(0.00) |
RI |
0.03 |
(0.04) |
|
IL |
0.03 |
(0.00) |
SC |
0.03 |
(0.00) |
|
IN |
0.03 |
(0.00) |
SD |
0.08 |
(0.00) |
|
KS |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
TN |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
|
KY |
0.08 |
(0.00) |
TX |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
|
LA |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
UT |
0.08 |
(0.00) |
|
MA |
0.01 |
(0.22) |
VA |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
|
MD |
0.06 |
(0.00) |
VT |
0.04 |
(0.01) |
|
ME |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
WA |
0.07 |
(0.00) |
|
MI |
0.04 |
(0.00) |
WI |
0.09 |
(0.00) |
|
MN |
0.06 |
(0.00) |
WV |
0.05 |
(0.00) |
|
MO |
0.06 |
(0.00) |
WY_____ |
0.08__________ |
(0.00)_________ |
|
MS______ |
0.04__________ |
(0.00)_________ |
sum_______ |
2.71__________ |
(0.01)_________ |
Notes: p-values between parentheses.
21
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