XREAP2007-14
Notes: p-values between parentheses, Lander names in bold are former West-German states; for the
specification for Germany, a shift dummy and time trend is included since 1991 for the full sample
estimates.
Table 5. Fiscal rule, (1) and (6), German federal government
federal government__________________________________________________________________ | ||||||
1971-2005____________________ |
1971-1990_______________ |
1991-2005_______________ | ||||
(1)_____________ |
(6)_______________ |
(1)__________ |
(6) |
(1)___________ |
(6) | |
P |
-0.01 |
-0.01 |
-0.05 |
-0.04 |
0.03 |
0.05 |
(0.75) |
(0.76) |
(0.46) |
(0.38) |
(0.44) |
(0.21) | |
α |
0.59 |
0.30 |
0.31 | |||
(0.61) |
(0.08) |
(0.83) | ||||
obs |
34 |
34 |
20 |
~1λ |
~4 |
~~L4 |
R2 |
0.01 |
0.02 |
0.04 |
0.23 |
0.03 |
0.04 |
1975 |
1976 |
- |
- |
- |
- | |
AQ |
(0.23) |
(0.29) | ||||
AP |
(0.14) |
(0.19) | ||||
Bai |
1984 |
1979 | ||||
(0.00) |
(0.00) | |||||
[1979;1984] |
[1977;1981] |
Notes: heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust OLS estimates; AQ and AP indicate the
corrected Andrews Quandt and Andrews Ploberger break date for the fiscal rule; the
breaktest of Bai is Bai (1997), with the 33% confidence interval; for the specification for
Germany, a shift dummy and time trend is included since 1991 for the full sample estimates.
Table 6. Fiscal rule, panel fixed effects, panel of German Lander
all Lander________ |
old Lander________________________ |
new Lander____ | ||||||
1970-2005 |
1970-1990 |
1991-2005 |
1991-2005 | |||||
(1)______ |
(6)_______ |
(1)_____ |
(6) |
(1)______ |
(6) |
(1)_____ |
(6) | |
P |
0.01 |
-0.03 |
-0.01 |
0.05 |
-0.05 |
-0.05 |
0.08 |
-0.02 |
(0.58) |
(0.04) |
(0.24) |
(0.68) |
(0.03) |
(0.02) |
(0.03) |
(0.40) | |
α |
-0.09 |
0.08 |
0.01 |
-0.16 | ||||
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.57) |
(0.00) | |||||
obs |
439 |
439 |
220 |
220 |
154 |
154 |
78 |
78 |
R2 within |
0.01 |
0.13 |
0.02 |
0.11 |
0.14 |
0.13 |
0.24 |
0.55 |
R2 between |
0.61 |
0.88 |
0.95 |
0.09 |
0.43 |
0.42 |
0.93 |
0.11 |
R2 overall |
0.11 |
0.30 |
0.35 |
0.03 |
0.34 |
0.34 |
0.01 |
0.35 |
Hausman |
150.85 |
41.05 |
62.27 |
70.93 |
358.51 |
340.05 |
24.51 |
10.93 |
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
(0.00) |
Notes: p-values between parentheses; for the specification for Germany, a shift dummy and
time trend is included since 1991 for the full sample estimates.
23
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