Strategic Effects and Incentives in Multi-issue Bargaining Games



bargaining round related to the division of cake 1 is longer than the bargaining round
in which players attempt to divide cake
2. Bearing in mind this double interpretation,
we derive the players’ preferences over agendas among the issue-by-issue procedures
in the presence of a difficult/urgent issue.

Moreover, to simplify the presentation, we focus on the case in which players are
symmetric and that some frictions tend to disappear (
ri = r, λi = λ for i =1, 2
moreover, 0).

Proposition 4 In agenda 1, for ∆ 0, the SPE demands are as follows:

(2 + λ)(1 - α)

i X1 = ʌ-----⅞-----S i У2 = 1                        (47)

2

fθr \/1 ' a - 1 < λ < α(1+α) ;

λ2 +2λ - α      1+2λ - λ2α

lx1 = 2λ(1 + a) , ly2 = 2λ(1 + a)                     (48)

for α(1+α) -α < λ < a + pa(1 + a) and

(1+ 2λ)(1 - α)

i xi = 1, 1У2 = ʌ------£-------                        (49)

for λ > a + √a(1 + a).

Proof. For ri = r, λi = λ for i =1, 2, The solution of the indifferent conditions are
as follows:

2 - aδ)(1 - 2) + λ(1 + δ)(1 - aδ)
λ(1 + δ)(1
- a2δ2)

(50)

(51)


λ(1 + δ)(1 - aδ) + (1 - aδλ2)(1 - 2)
λ(1 + δ)(1
- a2δ2)

27



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