that player 1 is indifferent between accepting and rejecting this offer so as to demand
for the entire surplus:
e l' (1 — αδ2)(1 + λ) — δ(1 — α) λ(1 — α)
(59)
ag2 y2 = ∆→o 1 + αδ = 1 + α
On the other hand, if λ > 1, player 2 demands y2 = 1 while player 1 demands a share
equal to ag2 xe1 where ag2 xe1 is such that player 2 is indifferent between accepting and
rejecting this offer so as to demand for the entire surplus:
1e, = lim(1 - αδ2)(1 + λ)- δλ(1 - α)
1 — α
(1 + α)λ
(60)
ag2 ∆→0 (1 + αδ)λ
We can now show that when there is a difficult/urgent issue, parties prefer to
postpone it and to agree over the easy issue first, even if this is not very important.
Proposition 6 When there is a difficult/urgent issue, parties can only agree in post-
poning such an issue regardless of its importance.
Proof. Let’s assume α> 1/3, given the SPE demands in Agenda 1, we distinguish
5 cases:
A) Let 0 < λ < λGR, where λGr = Vα(1+α) -α, in this case in agenda 1 Player
1 demands (2+λ)2(1~α), while in Agenda 2 player 1 obtains the entire surplus. In this
case player 1 obtains a larger payoff inagenda1ifλ is sufficiently large (at the
limit λ > λYe with λYe = α(1+a)~1+√√2-~a,~2a +a +a ), otherwise, he prefers agenda 2.
30
More intriguing information
1. The name is absent2. ISO 9000 -- A MARKETING TOOL FOR U.S. AGRIBUSINESS
3. Changing spatial planning systems and the role of the regional government level; Comparing the Netherlands, Flanders and England
4. Sector Switching: An Unexplored Dimension of Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries
5. Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation
6. Should informal sector be subsidised?
7. Inflation and Inflation Uncertainty in the Euro Area
8. Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests and global climate negotiations
9. The Modified- Classroom ObservationScheduletoMeasureIntenticnaCommunication( M-COSMIC): EvaluationofReliabilityandValidity
10. Telecommuting and environmental policy - lessons from the Ecommute program