for λB <λ< 1 and α> 0.5 players never agree over agenda, while for α< 0.5 and
max {λB ,λY } <λ<λG (see fig. 2) both players prefer agenda 2.
Agreement arises for max{λB,λY } <λ<λG
C) Let 1 < λ < α + ʌ/a(l + α), then in agenda 1 player 1 demands x1 as for case
B), while in agenda 2 in equilibrium player 1 obtains ag2 xe1 as defined in (60). In this
case, since λ> 1, it is straightforward to show that player 1 always prefers agenda 1
while player 2 always prefers agenda 2.
D) Let λ>α+ α(1 + α), then player obtains the entire surplus in agenda 1 and
32
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