ly2 > 1 and for λ > -+^^α^+α), lУ2 < 0. Let α > 1/3, then, since
о < √ι+α -1 < Pα(1+α)- α < α+■.„.•. <1+p(1+α)
αα
the SPE demands are as defined in proposition 4, where the demand lxe1 and lye2
by player 1 and 2 respectively are such that the responder is indifferent between
accepting or rejecting the proposal so as to demand the entire surplus. ■
Similarly in agenda 2 where cake 2 is shared first the SPE is characterised by the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 In agenda 2, for ∆ → 0, the SPE demands are as follows: if λ< 1,
λ(1-α)
1+α .
player demands the entire surplus, while player 2 demands a share ag2 ye2 =
If λ> 1, player 2 demand the entire surplus, while player 1 demands the share
x1 =
ag2 1
1—α
(1+α)λ .
Proof. The solution of the indifferent conditions give demands:
ag2x1
ag2y2
(1 - δλ2)(1 - αδ2) + λ(1 - δ)(1 + αδ)
λ(1 + αδ)(1 - δ2)
(57)
(58)
λ(1 - δ)(1 + αδ) + (λ2 - δ)(1 - αδ2)
λ(1 + αδ)(1 - δ2)
These are SPE demands if they are in (0,1). At the limit for ∆ → 0, the demands
ag2x1 and ag2y2 in (57) and (58) tends to sgn(1 - λ)∞ and sgn(λ - 1)∞ respectively.
This implies that the SPE demands in agenda 2 are as follows: if λ< 1, player 1
demands x1 = 1 while Player 2 demands a share equal to ag2ye2 where ag2 ye2 is such
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