Strategic Effects and Incentives in Multi-issue Bargaining Games



and the equilibrium payoffs are as follows:

1 - δ2

v1

v2


-----——2 [(1 δ1δ2)(1 + α2λ2)λι + (δ1 δ2)(α1 α2λ1λ2)]

(8)

(9)


δ1δ )2

1---χ .''i2 [(1 — δ1δ2)(λ1 + α1) + (δ1 — δ2)(α1 — α2λ1λ2)]

δ1δ2)2λ1

3) If g α1 1, the equilibrium demands are y2 =1 and x1 = xe1 (0, 1), where

(1 δ2)[l δ1δ2 + α2λ2(l δ1)(1 + δ2)]
(1 — διδ2)

and the equilibrium payoffs are as follows:

v1

v2


(1 δ2)[λ1(l δ1δ2 + α2λ2(l δι)(1 + δ2)) + α1δ1]

(11)

(12)


1 δ1δ2

δ2[1 δ1δ2 + α2λ2(1 δ1)]

1 δ1δ2

Proof. The indifference conditions between accepting and rejecting an offer are the

following

1 — χ1 + α2λ2l-δδδ2 = δ2 (y2 + α2λ2(1-δ1δδ2)
(1 — y2)λ1 + α11--δδ2 = δ1 (x1λ1 + α1 (1-δ2δ21 ´

(13)


The solution of the system (13) are the demands x1 and y2 defined in (6) and (7)

above. It can be shown that x1 0 if and only if α1 <aand x1 1 if and only if

α1 >b. Similarly, y2 0 if and only if α1 >f and y2 1 if and only if α1 <g. It is

straightforward to see that f b and g a. Then, there is an intersection between
the interval
[b, a] and [f, g] if and only if g > b, that is λ2 λ2. Under this condition we
can distinguish three sections on the
α1 axis. First, when 0 α1 b, the equilibrium



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