risk function which is determined up to a linear positive transformation.
Hence we need to standardize these marginal risk increases to make them
comparable across investors. This is done by dividing - ηi through the ex-
pected slope of the risk function based on the efficient portfolio, E[fi (ei)].
Hence the inverse sharing constant measures the standardized efficient risk
increase due to a marginal reduction in the initial endowment.
In order to gain some insight into the mechanics of the risk-value model,
we analyse the impact of changes in initial endowment and in the required
expected return on an investor’s sharing constant. For simplicity of notation,
we drop the index i in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Consider risk-value efficient portfolios under the condition
λ > 0 and η < 0. Then, given the prices of state-contingent claims, the
sharing constant s declines when
- the initial endowment Hq increases, or
- the required expected return R* increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Lemma 1 it is apparent that the sharing constants differ across
investors. The sharing constants, in fact, prohibit linear sharing rules. This
is illustrated by proposition 2 which does not constrain f z(e) to be positive.
It should be noted that each investor has a linear absolute sharing rule if all
relative sharing rules are linear, and vice versa.
Proposition 2 : Let f z(e) be unconstrained in sign. Then in an equilibrium
with risk-value models every investor has a linear (absolute) sharing rule if
and only if every investor uses a quadratic function F(ê).
Proof. See Appendix B.
20
More intriguing information
1. The name is absent2. The name is absent
3. Regional Intergration and Migration: An Economic Geography Model with Hetergenous Labour Force
4. Parallel and overlapping Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B and C virus Infections among pregnant women in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria
5. The name is absent
6. The Institutional Determinants of Bilateral Trade Patterns
7. Herman Melville and the Problem of Evil
8. Kharaj and land proprietary right in the sixteenth century: An example of law and economics
9. Informal Labour and Credit Markets: A Survey.
10. INSTITUTIONS AND PRICE TRANSMISSION IN THE VIETNAMESE HOG MARKET