Heterogeneity of Investors and Asset Pricing in a Risk-Value World



These conditions are related to those obtained by Leland (1980) in an EU
equilibrium.

4.2 HARA-Based Risk Functions

In this section, we derive more specific results assuming that the risk function
F belongs to the negative HARA-class. F(e) is given by equation (2) with
7 > 2 or 7 < 1. 7 is assumed to be the same for all investors.

A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium in the case of a
non-exponential risk function (7 > 
-∞) is

(A+J-_) a+
i                              1


ê£


> о,


V ε with A ≡ ɪɪ Ai and eε ≡ ɪɪ e.


This condition must hold because Ai + e /(1 7) > 0 Vi, ε is required
by the FOC (11) resp. (14). Let e
i ei, then eε = ε e. Hence an
equilibrium requires A + (ε
e) / (1 7) > 0. For the more important case
7 < 1 this implies ε
e A(1 7), V ε. If Wq ≡ ∑i Wqi, then in equilibrium
Wq is the forward market value of the aggregate payoff ε, i.e. Wq = U(επ(ε)).

We first show that investor i’s sharing rule relative to that of investor j
is either concave, linear or convex.

Proposition 4 ; Consider two investors i and j who measure risk by a neg-
ative HARA-function with
7 being the same for both. Then the following
statements are equivalent;

- Investor i,s sharing rule is strictly convex [linear] [strictly concave] rel-
ative to that of investor j.

- Investor i,s sharing constant is smaller than [equal to][greater than] that
of investor j.

Proof. See Appendix D.

22



More intriguing information

1. Workforce or Workfare?
2. Environmental Regulation, Market Power and Price Discrimination in the Agricultural Chemical Industry
3. Empirically Analyzing the Impacts of U.S. Export Credit Programs on U.S. Agricultural Export Competitiveness
4. Implementation of Rule Based Algorithm for Sandhi-Vicheda Of Compound Hindi Words
5. International Financial Integration*
6. THE AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS LABORATORY
7. Input-Output Analysis, Linear Programming and Modified Multipliers
8. The name is absent
9. The name is absent
10. The Impact of Minimum Wages on Wage Inequality and Employment in the Formal and Informal Sector in Costa Rica