The investor minimizes his risk subject to the budget contraint E(Rk) = 1
and the return constraint E(R) > R*. The solution gives the efficient return
sharing rule.
The ratio A/Wq is crucial for risk measurement if 7 > -∞. Depending
on the investor, the ratio A/Wq might be independent of Wq or not. Define
A* _ A R
W = W - 1 - 7 ’
Then
ʌ 1 - 7 /A* Rλ7
e[F(r)] = --7⅛(- + -) . (19)
Investors differ in terms of Wq /A* for 7 > -∞ resp. BWq for 7 = -∞
and the required expected return R*. Hence the sharing constants of two
investors differ because of differences in these parameters. Applying Lemma
1 shows that the sharing constant of an investor declines when Wq/A* resp.
BWq or the required expected return R* increases.
This proves
Proposition 5 ; Given the pricing kernel, the difference between the shar-
ing constants of investors i and j, (si - s3), is monotonically increasing in
(W0j∕A* - Wo√A*) for 7 > -∞ resp. (BjW(p- - BW) for 7 = -∞ and
(R - R)■
Before we discuss the sharing rules of these investors, it is helpful to
understand the impact of Wq/A* resp. BWq. The curvature of the risk
function, -f(R)/f (R), similar to absolute risk aversion, increases monoton-
ically in Wq/A* resp. BWq. Therefore we denote Wq/A* resp. BWq as the
investor’s risk sensitivity. With 1 > 7 > -∞, risk sensitivity is higher for
24
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