[26] Papai, S. (2000) “Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange,” Economet-
rica, 68, 1403-1433.
[27] Pathak, P.A. and T. Sonmez (2008) “Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Strate-
gic Players in the Boston Mechanism,” American Economic Review, 98, 1636-1652.
[28] Romero-Medina, A. (1998) “Implementation of Stable Solutions in a Restricted
Matching Market,” Review of Economic Design, 3, 137-147.
[29] Roth, A.E. (1982a) “Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods,”
Economics Letters, 9, 127-132.
[30] Roth, A.E. (1982b) “The Economics of Matching: Stability and Efficiency,” Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 92, 617-628.
[31] Roth, A.E. (1984) “Misrepresentation and Stability in the Marriage Problem,” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 34, 383-387.
[32] Roth, A.E. (2002) “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation,
and Computation as Tools for Design Economics,” Econometrica, 70, 1341-1378.
[33] Roth, A.E. and A. Postlewaite (1977) “Weak versus Strong Domination in a Market
with Indivisible Goods,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 4, 131-137.
[34] Roth, A.E. and M.A.O. Sotomayor (1990) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-
Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monograph Series. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
[35] Satterthwaite, M.A. and H. Sonnenschein (1981) “Strategy-Proof Allocation Mecha-
nisms at Differentiable Points,” Review of Economic Studies, 48, 587-597.
[36] Shapley, L.S. and H. Scarf (1974) “On Cores and Indivisibility,” Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics, 1, 23-37.
[37] Shinotsuka, T. and K. Takamiya (2003) “The Weak Core of Simple Games with
Ordinal Preferences: Implementation in Nash Equilibrium,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 44, 379-389.
[38] Sotomayor, M.A.O. (1998) “The Strategy Structure of the College Admissions Stable
Mechanisms,” Mimeo, Universidade de Sao Paulo.
48
More intriguing information
1. The name is absent2. Critical Race Theory and Education: Racism and antiracism in educational theory and praxis David Gillborn*
3. Why Managers Hold Shares of Their Firms: An Empirical Analysis
4. CREDIT SCORING, LOAN PRICING, AND FARM BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
5. The Structure Performance Hypothesis and The Efficient Structure Performance Hypothesis-Revisited: The Case of Agribusiness Commodity and Food Products Truck Carriers in the South
6. AGRIBUSINESS EXECUTIVE EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE: NEW MECHANISMS OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT INVOLVING THE UNIVERSITY, PRIVATE FIRM STAKEHOLDERS AND PUBLIC SECTOR
7. The name is absent
8. he Effect of Phosphorylation on the Electron Capture Dissociation of Peptide Ions
9. Insecure Property Rights and Growth: The Roles of Appropriation Costs, Wealth Effects, and Heterogeneity
10. An Intertemporal Benchmark Model for Turkey’s Current Account