Constrained School Choice

References

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[2] Abdulkadiroglu, A., P.A. Pathak, and A.E. Roth (2005) “The New York City High
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[3] Abdulkadiroglu, A., P.A. Pathak, and A.E. Roth (2008) “Strategy-proofness versus
Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,”
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[4] Abdulkadiroglu, A., P.A. Pathak, A.E. Roth, and T. Sonmez (2005) “The Boston
Public Schools Match,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,
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[5] Abdulkadiroglu, A., P.A. Pathak, A.E. Roth, and T. Sonmez (2006) “Changing the
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[6] Abdulkadiroglu, A. and T. Sonmez (1999) “House Allocation with Existing Tenants,”
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[7] Abdulkadiroglu, A. and T. Sonmez (2003) “School Choice: A Mechanism Design
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[8] Alcalde, J. (1996) “Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems,” Jour-
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[9] Balinski, M. and T. Soonmez (1999) “A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Place-
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[10] Chen, Y. and T. Soonmez (2006) “School Choice: An Exp erimental Study,” Journal
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[11] Calsamiglia, C., G. Haeringer, and F. Klijn (2008) “Constrained School Choice: An
Exp erimental Study,” Barcelona GSE Research Network Working Paper 365.

[12] Dubins, L.E. and D.A. Freedman (1981) “Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algo-
rithm,” American Mathematical Monthly, 88, 485-494.

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