Constrained School Choice



V (Q, σ(Q, s2)). Hence, σ(Q, j1) < σ(Q, s2) = σ(Q, j2), contradicting (13). Since j1 = j2,
f
s2 (j2) < fs2 (j1).

Let s = s1, s = s2, i = j1 , and i = j2. We have just shown that fs(i) < fs(i). By
Step 4, f
s(i) < fs(i). Define Is := As(Q)i and Is := As(Q)i'. By Step 1(b,c), Is and
Is are disjoint sets such that |Is| = qs — 1 and Is' | = qs' — 1. Moreover, by definition of
A
s(Q) and i, Is Uf(i). Similarly, Is Uf'(is). Hence, schools s and stogether with
students
i and iconstitute an X-cycle.                                           □■

Proof of Theorem 7.2 Follows from Lemma B.12 and Proposition B.13.         

C Appendix: Proofs of Results in Section 8

Proof of Lemma 8.1 Let φ := γ, τ. We will prove that φ(Pik,Q-i)(i) = φ(Q')(i') for
all
Qi Q(k)11 or φ(Pk,Q-i)Piφ(Qi,Q-i) for some Q-i Q(k)Ii. (This obviously
completes the proof as it implies that no strategy k-dominates P
ik.)

Suppose φ(Pik, Q-i)(i) = φ(Q')(i') for some Q-i Q(k)Ii. We have to show that
for some Q
-i Q(k)Ii, φ(Pik,Q-i)Piφ(Qi,Q-i). Suppose that for some Q- Q1'^l,
φ(Q
i,Q-i)Piφ(Pik, Q-i). Since φ(Pik,Q-i)(i')Rii, we have s := φ(Qi, Q-i)(i) S. From
Lemma A.1 (for γ) and Lemma B.5 (for τ),
φ(s, Q-i)(i) = φ(Qi, Q-i)(i).

Suppose s is also listed in Pik. Then,
φ(Pk,C^-i)(i)Riφ(P k ,Q-i)(i = φ(s,Q-i}(i) = s,                 (14)

where P'k is the preference relation obtained from Pik by putting ' in the first position.
The first relation follows from Lemma 4.2. The second relation follows from the fact that
the assignment by the DA/TTC algorithm does not change if a student makes more schools
acceptable
and puts them below the school he is assigned to. Clearly, (14) contradicts
φ(Qi, Q-i)Piφ(Pk, Q-i). Hence, ' is not listed in Pik.

Let S := {s Ss : sQis }. The fact that ' is not listed in Pik together with the
definition of
Pik implies that there is a school s S listed in Pik with sPis. Let s* be the
P
i-best school among the schools s S listed in Pik with sPis.

Suppose φ = γ. Since φ(Qi,Q-i) NW (Qi,Q-i), φ(Qi, Q-i)(s) = qs for all s S.
Clearly, for all s S, i φ(Qi,Q-i)(s'). Also, for all s,t S with s = t, φ(Qi,Q-i)(s')
φ(Qi, Q-i)(t) = 0. So we can define for j Ii,

Qj:=


s if j φ(Qi, Q-i)(s) for some s S,
0 otherwise.

44



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