On Dictatorship, Economic Development and Stability



∂L

λT> 0,
∂λ
t

λt0,

λ∂L
λ
t ∂λt

=0

∂L

∂μt ,

μt > 0,

∂L

μt^τ~
dμt

=0

dL > 0

∂δt

δt0,

∂L
μ
t ∂δ~t

=0

ktg-σ1
lim --^-
t→∞ (1 + ρ)t

=0

(19)

Equation (16) is the Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition with respect to τt, equation (17)
is the Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition with respect to
qt and equation (18) is the first-
order condition with respect to
kt+1 . Equation (19) is the transversality condition stating
that the actual value of the capital in terms of welfare is exhausted.

2.3.3 Dictatorship’s equilibrium

Given initial condition {k0}, a dictatorship’s equilibrium can be characterized by a path
{kt+1 t,qttt}t>0 such that equations (13)-(18) hold.

3 Dictatorship and economic development

In this section, we want to know whether all types of dictatorship regardless of political
constraints are economically feasible. Therefore, we do not take the insurrection constraint
(13) into account, i.e., we set
μ = 0 in equations (16) to (18). We thus study the existence

19



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