Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

RANE predictions, the bid ceilings of both Strong and Weak bidders are significantly lower
than predicted in all treatments.

Table 4 - Bid Shading and Bid Ceilings.

Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis; ^a Relative Bid Shading;

^** Significant at α = .05; ^* Significant at α = .10 (one-tailed)

3.1.3. Revenues

Table 5 reports the observed and expected revenues. In all treatments, observed revenues are
significantly greater than those expected in the RNNE (at α = .02, one-tailed), but are not
different from those expected in the RANE. The observation that revenues in SYM are closer
to the RANE than to the RNNE predictions is in line with the received literature that explains
overbidding in symmetric first-price auctions in terms of constant relative risk aversion.

Since the conclusions remain unchanged for the last 25 rounds of the experiment, we infer
that both the behavior of Strong and Weak bidders and the revenues generated by the different
treatments are consistent with the basic predictions of the Nash equilibrium models studied.

14

<<   <   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   >   >>