Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

patterns hold in the last 25 rounds, it appears that neither of these models provides a
consistent explanation of the behavior observed in the three treatments.¹⁰

Table 6 - Average RSD s from Nash Equilibrium Bid Functions (Standard Deviations)

^t This column reports the model with significantly smaller RSDs.
Significance levels: ^*** α = .01; ^** α = .05; ^* α = .10 (one-tailed)

Such significant deviations from the Nash equilibrium predictions could be due to the
bidder’s response mode, which is different from the one traditionally used. We therefore
considered the actual valuations that bidders received in the LOW treatment and conducted
the same tests as those reported in Pezanis-Christou (2002) which referred to similar LOW
sessions that were conducted with the traditional design. As we find no significant difference
across designs and as we reach the same conclusions, we infer that the observed behavior is
not significantly affected by the response mode we used in this experiment. Also, all our
conclusions for the three treatments remain unchanged when we test theoretical predictions
with the actual valuations and bids.

¹⁰ For all treatments, we checked whether subjects’ bidding behavior converges to the RNNE or RANE
predictions. Although we find negative Spearman rank correlation coefficients (between RSDs and t) for many
groups, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no convergence.

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