Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions





^^^“Strong
----Weak
-----RNNE (S)
.....RNNE (W)
-----RANE (S)
.....RANE (W)

Figure 1: Average Bid Functions (all rounds)

Table 6 reports the average RSDs and the test results of a comparison to the Nash equilibrium
predictions we considered. The deviations from the RNNE and RANE predictions are
relatively small, between 4% and 17% of the maximum possible deviations. However, those
from RANE are significantly smaller than those from RNNE for both Strong and Weak
bidders only in the symmetric treatment. In the asymmetric treatments, with the exception of
Strong bidders in MIX for whom the RNNE model outperforms the RANE one, the two
models perform equally well in explaining deviations. Deviations from RANE are also
significantly smaller in the symmetric treatment than in the asymmetric ones. As these

16



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