A Location Game On Disjoint Circles



4. D≥ι Γi = ∑iι Ωi = N.

The endogenously determined number of rounds in a given play of the
game will be denoted by
Z. Obviously Γ = SZ=1 Γr and Ω = SZ=1 Ωr.
Notice that the restrictions of the game imply that
Z ≥ 2.

Let C be any circle and let (x, y) be an ordered pair of elements of C.
We will use (
x, y) to denote the arc of the circle between x and y in clockwise
direction. Let
a(x, y) [0, 1] denote an angle in clockwise direction between
halflines starting from the center of the circle and going through
x and y
(we normalize an angle, so that a full circle has angle equal to 1). Then
d(x, y) = min{a(x, y), a(y, x)} is the angular distance between x and y.
Notice that
d(x, y) = d(y, x) [0, 1/2]. Given an arc (x, y), the length (or a
volume) of (
x, y) is a(x, y).

Given a circle Ck , let

AR(Ck) = x Ck : min d (x, w) min d (x, b)

be a set of points of Ck that are closer to points placed by R on Ck than
to points placed there by
G. Let AG(Ck) be the analogical set defined for
G. Notice that each of these sets is a finite set of arcs of a circle Ck . Let A
be a finite set of arcs and let V (A) denote the volume (sum of lengths, in
angular terms) of arcs in
A. When the game ends, each player p receives a
score
Sp equal to the volume of the set of arcs constituting the set of points
closest to a position chosen by that player over all circles, that is

K

Sp = X V (Ap(Ck))
k=1

for p {R, G}. Given these scores, the payoff of the players is up(Sp, Sq) =
Sp - Sq, where {p, q} = {R, G}. We say that the game is a tie if Sp = Sq,
while player
p wins if Sp > Sq . A strategy in general will be a contingent
plan for every possible history of the game. We do not need to define this



More intriguing information

1. A multistate demographic model for firms in the province of Gelderland
2. EU enlargement and environmental policy
3. The name is absent
4. DEMAND FOR MEAT AND FISH PRODUCTS IN KOREA
5. Accurate and robust image superresolution by neural processing of local image representations
6. Does Market Concentration Promote or Reduce New Product Introductions? Evidence from US Food Industry
7. Chebyshev polynomial approximation to approximate partial differential equations
8. Asymmetric transfer of the dynamic motion aftereffect between first- and second-order cues and among different second-order cues
9. The name is absent
10. Economie de l’entrepreneur faits et théories (The economics of entrepreneur facts and theories)