The Effects of Reforming the Chinese Dual-Track Price System



track ration x, while a type-2 household is allocated no ration at all. We also allow
for different endowments of Y being held by the two types.

The representative type-1 household faces the problem

max U (x1, y1)
x1,y1

subject to px1 + y1 y1 + (p p)x m1,              (9)

where y1 is its endowment of Y. Unlike in (1), the budget line is not kinked.
Because resale is possible, household
1 can be thought of as always selling its
entire plan-track allocation to gain the implicit subsidy
(p p)X, and then buying
the amount it wishes to consume. The implicit subsidy is a component of its full
income
m1 .

The problem for the representative type-2 household is

(10)


max U (x2, y2)
x2,y2

subject to px2 + y2 y2 m2.

Because a type-2 household does not receive a plan-track allocation of X , its full
income m
2 is simply its endowment y2.

18



More intriguing information

1. A dynamic approach to the tendency of industries to cluster
2. A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON UNDERINVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL R&D
3. A Theoretical Growth Model for Ireland
4. Behaviour-based Knowledge Systems: An Epigenetic Path from Behaviour to Knowledge
5. The name is absent
6. Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations
7. TECHNOLOGY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND FIRM LOCATION IN THE SPANISH MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS INDUSTRY.
8. The name is absent
9. The name is absent
10. The Shepherd Sinfonia