Regulation of the Electricity Industry in Bolivia: Its Impact on Access to the Poor, Prices and Quality

The first group results are summarized in Figure 3.11 below.

Figure 3.11

Average Frequency of Interruptions

ɪ Cre Ele Electropaz ɪ Elfec

Source: Superintendency of Electricity

As illustrated, none of the operators even came close to the allowed limit, which raises the
question on whether the permissible limits are inducing quality - as they should be - or not
inducing anything. Generally, all three companies did well, though Cre, serving Santa Cruz, and
especially Elfec, serving Cochabamba, did a comparatively better job than Electropaz, serving La
Paz, at improving performance.

Since the results just presented show a recurring pattern of behaviour in terms of quality
guidelines that seem to be over generous, it is relevant to question whether these guidelines are
portraying an industry that has been successful in influencing the behaviour of the agency
purportedly there to regulate it. Though a “capture“ of the regulator might not be the most
appropriate term in light of only 4 observations, it does seem the case that the quality guidelines
are too lax and unable to induce “virtuous“ behaviour from the part of operators in the industry.

As for the second group, Figure 3.12 summarizes their performance over the two-year period.
Here there is a more erratic pattern of behaviour for all three companies. Generally speaking, this
indicator of quality seems to worsen for the group as a whole. Sepsa, serving Potosi, is the one
with the better performance, and Cessa, serving Chuquisaca, the one with the worst. With this

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