As with the previous group, in this one none of the companies surpassed the allowed time limit.
The general conclusion, however, is that there is worsening behaviour in all companies, including
Sepsa, the one that has the best performance throughout the 4-semester period. With this group,
the pattern of behaviour with this quality indicator is very much the same as with the first
indicator, showing that the quality guidelines established by the Superintendency apparently do
not meet the challenge of inducing better behaviour of the regulated enterprises.
4. Conclusions and Recommendations
An important first conclusion is that the SIRESE system is still very young and so it is too early
to assess final verdicts on its performance. It can be stated, however, that antimonopoly
provisiones within its regulatory framework seem to be out of place, and hence the possibility of
taking them out should become a valid discussion point.
Coverage of electricity users has grown faster in urban areas ever since the establishment of
regulation. Although it is not argued that regulation has caused the increase in electricity
consumers, the data does show that a comparatively faster urban growth rate of users takes place
after 1995. In this sense, it seems plausible that regulation of the electricity industry has indeed
lessen poverty levels in urban Bolivia by making this utility more accessible to larger segments of
the urban population.
The same cannot be said, however, about rural Bolivia. The results show that coverage has
remained about the same in the last 10 years, with no discernible improvement after the
transformation of the industry in 1995. When rural Bolivia is divided into income groups, the
data shows that some of the poorest groups have indeed experienced a decline in coverage during
the regulation period, which sheds doubts about the purportedly positive effects that structural
changes in this industry were to have in the livelihoods of the poorest people in the country.
It has also been shown that the cost of the service has increased throughout Bolivia - at a faster
rate during the regulation period, though the same caveat applies here regarding the causality
between regulation and higher tariffs. The increase in rates in rural Bolivia has been faster and
more steep than in urban areas, which may partly be the result of less cross subsidization between
categories of consumers. Regardless of the reason, and as it refers to pricing of the commodity,
rural consumers have again not benefitted in any discernible way from the transformation of the
industry.
24