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Table 2. The Effect of Export Tax Rebates on Brazilian Export Price, 1960-1991^@

Dependent Variable	PSantos 4 ____________(6.1)	PSantos 4 (6.2)
Independent Variables_______
Constant	-0.07	-0.04
	(1.18)	(0.59)
Alpha^&	0.45 ^a	0.52 ^a
	(9.13)	(8.03)
Alpha*D1965-71	0.26	0.32
	(0.56)	(0.53)
Alph^a*D1972-79	-0.40^a	-0.15
	(3.61)	(1.02)
PCOMPETITOR^@	0.95 ^a	1.01 ^a
	(24.96)	(18.51)
Relative supply^#	-0.34^a	-0.48^a
	(3.02)	(3.27)
D1977	1.24^a	0.87^a
	(12.39)	(5.94)
D1979	-0.37^a	-0.50^a
	(4.79)	(4.79)
DW	2.21	2.02
Adjusted R²	0.99	0.99
F-Statistic	540.13 ^a	304.47 ^a

^@ The competitor price in Eqs. 2.1 is that for MAMS and the competitor price for Eqs 2.2
is that for Other Milds, each as quoted on the New York market.

^& Alpha = (avisos redeemed in year t)/(Brazilian coffee exports in year t), i.e., the unit coffee
export tax rebate.

^# The independent variable is the deviation from trend of the relative supply of Brazilian and
Colombian coffee, i.e., XBrazil/XColombia.

^a Coefficient significant at 1%

^b Coefficient significant at 5%

^c Coefficient significant at 10%

Source: Data on prices and exports taken from Bacha, 1992, Statistical Appendix. Data on
Avisos from Bertone, 1992.

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