CESifo Working Paper No. 1900
On the Desirability of Taxing
Charitable Contributions
Abstract
We develop a model that allows for public goods and status signaling through charitable
contributions. This model provides a unified framework in which contributions are driven
both by altruism and status signaling. We use this setup to re-examine the conventional
practice of rendering a favorable tax treatment to charitable contributions.
JEL Code: H2, D6.
Keywords: optimal taxation, re-distribution, charitable contributions, inequality.
Tomer Blumkin
Department of Economics
Ben-Gurion University
Beer-Sheba 84105
Israel
[email protected]
Efraim Sadka
The Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Tel Aviv University
Tel-Aviv 69978
Israel
December 2006
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