Optimal Private and Public Harvesting under Spatial and Temporal Interdependence

21

In contrast to Faustmann model, a higher timber price may lengthen the rotation age.
Moreover, private rotation age reacts positively or negatively to exogenous
harvesting, depending on how the degree of substitutability or complementarity, i.e.
temporal dependence, between the stands evolves in time. Third, based on this
analysis and on assumptions concerning access restrictions we derive several new
rules for public harvesting. By and large they show that in the presence of stand
interdependence the Hartman rotation age, derived under the single, stand has to be
modified.

There are several avenues for further research. First, a natural step is to extend the
analysis to include interdependent stands under sole ownership, which internalizes the
(positive and negative) externality effects caused by changes in the age of an
exogenous adjacent stand. Second, modeling the interaction between private and
public agent as a two-stage game with government being a Stackelberg leader is only
one - and not always the most plausible - alternative. In the absence of the Forest
Service’s commitment we would end up with a Nash game between the Forest
Service and private forest owners. Third, we used a simple form of the ‘felicity’
function to describe the value of amenities in terms of the age of the focal stand and
of the relationship between the focal stand and the exogenous stands. A next step is to
reformulate the felicity function to describe the age factor in a more realistic way, e.g.
in terms of a share of decaying trees, and tree species diversity. Finally, as the optimal
rules for public harvesting depend on the precise type of amenity valuation, it would
be an important topic to study empirically the interdependence between private and
public stands in the provision of amenity services.

<<   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   >>

More intriguing information