Federal Tax-Transfer Policy and Intergovernmental Pre-Commitment



s1 + s2 = τ(l1 + l2) are differentiated with respect to ti which yields in matrix notation:

b b''(gl)       0

0 b"(gj)

∖    1        1


ιi

∂τ li + τlir

l

l + τljτ

- ∑n.1(ln + Tin ) )


∣∣" ( gi )( tikii + ki ) dti

-b' ( gj ) tj kji dti

0


Applying Cramer’s Rule:

∂si A11 ∂sj A21 ∂τ _ A3
∂⅛i
= 7^T, ∂β = 7^T an ∂ti = 7^T,

(24)


where

; = b'' ( gi ) (-b" ( gj ) Σ< ln+τln ) + 1+j ]+b" ( gj ) 1+7 <0.

A11 = -b"(g')(tikii + ki) ( -b"(gj) X(ln + τl"τ) + ^+ ,j )

        n=1                       η /

r) 1                         . ■

+∂τ τ+η?b''( gj >tj   .

.. . .. . . ,. ʌ                  .. ...      .    1

O21 = b''(g')b''(gj)tjkj £(ln + τl';)+ b''(g`)(tikii + k`)

n =1                                           '

- τ+√b''(gj)tjkji,   and

A31 = b''(gi)b''(gj)tjkj + b''(gi)b''(gj)(t` + ki) > 0.                                  (25)

Given by the second-order conditions of the federal optimization problem A < 0. The sign of
A31 is strictly positive since tjkji > 0 and by assumption (A) tik'i + ki > 0. Helpful in signing
A11 and A21 we rewrite both determinants as:

A11 = β(tik'i + ki) + α      and      A21 = β(tjkji) - α,                 (26)

with

.....     . ∂   1       ..     . ∂ ∂   1

α := -b '( g )( tikii + kl ) — —- + b' '( gj ) tj kj — —-    and

t ∂τ 1 + ηj            t ∂τ 1 + ηi

2

β := b' '( cf ) b' '( cf )£( ln + τlnτ ).

n =1

26



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