Federal Tax-Transfer Policy and Intergovernmental Pre-Commitment



For case (iii) and (iv) τti < 0 and siti 0. Thus, Lemma 1 predicts td > tN . In case (iv),
τti < 0 and siti = 0 and consequently td > tN . In case (i), (ii), and (v), the transfer and labor
tax response are opposite in sign. Lemma 2 provides a condition which allows us to sign the
net-effect in these three cases.

Lemma 2: In case (i), (ii), and (v), condition (27) is equivalent to the condition

1    <>

β(t(tikβ + ki - tjkji)+ αJ = >0 ≠- tdl = \tN.                  (28)

2                      I >I <

Proof: Substituting Eqs. (16) and (18) into condition (27) yields

i b00 ( дг ) b00 ( gj ) tj kji + b00 ( дг ) b00 ( gj )( ti + ki )    < i β ( tiktii + ki ) + '>

-l----------------И---------------- S  b (g )------И------.

Multiplying by -|A| > 0 gives

li (b00(gi)b00(gj)tjkji + b00(gi)b00(gj)(ti + ki)´    S    b0(gi) β(tik*i + ki) + α.      (29)

Using the fact that in equilibrium b0(gi) = ^+1^ (see Eq. (11)) and rearranging condition (29)
leads to

2 β ( tikii + ki + tj kji ) S β ( tikiti + ki ) + α

(30)


with β > 0 as given by Eq. (20). Since in case (i), (ii), and (v), β(tiktii + ki) + α > 0, inequality
(30) can be rewritten to

0 S   2 β ( tiktii + ki — tj kji ) + α.

Note, the inequality is equivalent to

-liτti     S     b0(gi)siti

28



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