Federal Tax-Transfer Policy and Intergovernmental Pre-Commitment



and to the corresponding tax rates given by condition (27) in Lemma 1.

In case (i), tiktii + ki > tj ktji , which gives α > 0. Consequently, implied by Lemma 2 state
i chooses td < tN . The decrease in si, following a marginal increase in ti , dominates the positive
effect of a lower labor tax rate. In case (
ii), tiktii +ki < tj ktji and, thus, α < 0. Lemma 2 predicts
a tax rate choice
td > tN . In case (v), tiktii + ki = tj ktji and, thus, α = 0. Consequently, td = tN .

To infer how the federal government sets labor taxes and transfers in a symmetric equilibrium,
we evaluate how the FMCPF and the marginal benefit of transfer spending have changed due
to an adjustment in capital taxes (relative to the Nash outcome). First observe that at a
symmetric allocation the FMCPF is independent of the level of
td, ceteris paribus. The reason
is that in any symmetric equilibrium capital employment is
ki = к which yields an identical
labor demand across regimes. Also, for a given
τ, labor supply is unchanged - see (1). Thus,
equilibrium employment behavior is independent of the level of capital taxes once symmetrically
chosen. Furthermore, given
s = sN , b0(g) T b0(gN) if td S tN . Following the federal first-order
condition (11) and assumption (A), the federal government will choose
τd T τN if td S tN .
Since the federal government operates on the upward-sloping part of the federal tax revenue
curve (0
> ηi > -1 - see (11)), sd T sN if and only if τd T τN which completes the proof of
Proposition 3.

References

[1] Akai, N. and M. Sato, 2005, Decentralized leadership meets soft budget, CIRJE Discussion
Paper, vol. 391 (F-series), Tokyo.

[2] Becker, G.S., 1981, A treatise on the family, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

[3] Bernheim, B. and M. Whinston, 1986, Common agency, Econometrica 54, 923-942.

29



More intriguing information

1. The name is absent
2. Constrained School Choice
3. The name is absent
4. Retirement and the Poverty of the Elderly in Portugal
5. Spatial patterns in intermunicipal Danish commuting
6. BARRIERS TO EFFICIENCY AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF TOWNSHIP-VILLAGE ENTERPRISES
7. TLRP: academic challenges for moral purposes
8. Imperfect competition and congestion in the City
9. The name is absent
10. Education as a Moral Concept