Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption



Therefore, in equilibrium, the aggregate consumption for household h is (χ,y) = (δ, 2).
The associated individual shares are

σ

x 1 = -----x = σ ;

σ+τ

τ

x 2 = -----x = τ ;

σ+τ

_ σ*    _ 1   σ*

y1     *-* I *y y     O *-* I — * ;

σ + τ*    2 σ* + τ*

_*                 λ-*

τ        1τ

y2 = σ* + τ* y = 2 σ* + τ*

As a function of α, consumer 1 achieves

u 1 = -1 μ 1 )1 -γ1 μ σ** )1- 1

γ1             α

= const 1 ∙ α 1 -----------------—

1 - γ2 - (γ1 - γ2)α

which is increasing in α. Consumer 2 achieves

1-γ2

u2


τγ2

const2 (1 -α )γ 2 μ -—τ1α—r )
1 - γ1 - (γ2 - γ1)(1 - α)

which is decreasing in α. Hence a shift of bargaining power from consumer 2 to con-
sumer 1 benefits consumer 1 and harms consumer 2, who ends up consuming less of
both commodities.

Proof of Proposition 3

Good ` serves as a nume´raire so that the price system assumes the form (p1 , . . . , p`-1, 1).

We consider the first-order conditions of maximizing Sh in household h:5

1 ∂ uh1

αh~jJ ~0~-     λh pk = 0, k = 1, ■ ■ ■ , ' - 1;

Uh1 ∂xh1

αh~rτ     λh = 0;

Uh1

(1 - αh )— ∙ -—k    λh pk = 0, k = 1, ■ ■ ■ , ' - 1;

Uh2 ∂xkh2

(1 - αh)~j~τ--λh = 0

Uh2

5 Note that our assumption of sufficient endowments with the num´eraire good in all households
allows us to work with the entire set of first-order conditions.

29



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