(1 - αh) TT 2^ ʌ Uh2(xh2) - λh = 0’
Uh2 (xh2 )
Using the budget constraint and the first-order conditions yields
1 ττ' TU ʌ (л ∖2Jw2(whP1 + wh - xh 1 P1) n
αh Uh ((x 1 ) Uh 1( xh 1) (1 αh ) U hDlrD +w2 11 np p1 0
Uh1(xh1) Uh2whP1 +wh - xh1 P1
or
1 αh F1 (xh 1) = F2 (w1 P1 + wh - xh 1P1) ∙ P1 (24)
1 - αh 1 1 2 1
where F1 ≡ ln Uh1 and F2 ≡ ln Uh2 . F10 and F20 are strictly decreasing functions.
Hence, for a given P1 , a higher (equal) αh requires a higher (identical) consumption of
good 1 to preserve (24). This shows (i) and (ii).
By the same argument, an increase of αh raises ceteris paribus the aggregate de-
mand for good 1. Further examination of (24) shows that for fixed bargaining power
parameters, aggregate demand for good 1 is a decreasing function of P1. Consequently,
if only αh is increased, then the equilibrium price Pb1 rises and the equilibrium con-
sumption of all first members except h1 is reduced. Finally, market clearing implies
that the equilibrium consumption of h1 goes up. This shows (iii) and, by symmetry,
(iv).
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