An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia



gears, increased fishing efforts, and general improvement of people’s income were reported
by fishers. Seri fishers also have highest scores both for current income and degree of family
well-being (Tables 16.21 and 16.23).

Economic equality

Disparities in income are not significantly different between the villages except for future
expectations and future conditions (Table 16.15). As with the larger sample of 28 villages,
there is no consistent relationship with
sasi status. A perception of equality is higher amongst
fishers who are members of a fishers’ group (i.e., mostly IDT or KEP groups), fishers who
have more expensive gear types, fishers who do not think
sasi is important (mostly young
fishers in Seri and Hutumuri), and fishers who believe that decision-making in their village is
a process of majority or total agreement (Table 16.12). Village to village differences on opinion
of
sasi can be found in Figure 16.1.

Expected change is towards more equality in Hutumuri and Seri. In contrast, Tuhaha and Haruku
expect decline. Currently, fishers in Haruku perceive the greatest disparity. Haruku has few
fishers organized into groups and they do not own expensive gears (i.e., lift nets or FADs).

16.6.2 Efficiency

Communal decision-making

Compared to 15 years ago, partnership in fisheries rule design has decreased in Nolloth and
Hulaliu; it remained static everywhere else (Table 16.16). As with the larger performance
analysis, there is no clear division between the
sasi and non-sasi villages. A higher level of
communal decision-making is correlated with a high economic score, more expensive gear
types and satisfaction with fishing rules as they are. The perception that decision-making is
by elites is held more strongly by those experiencing a low level of communal decision-making
(Table 16.17).

Table 16.15. Differences among villages in terms of perception of economic equality among villagers, as
determined by ANOVA. Duncan’s test indicates ranking of the six villages (average descending from
left to right). Lines connect villages that are not significantly different from one another. Hl=Hulaliu,
Ht=Hutumuri, Tu=Tuhaha, Se=Seri, Ha=Haruku, No=Nolloth.

Economic equality

Overall average

Anova F

Prob.

Duncan’s post-hoc test

Change over past 15 years

-0.01

1.763

0.123

Ha No Tu Ht Hl Se

Expected change

-0.28

2.642

0.026

Tu Ha No Hl Se Ht

Past condition

6.59

1.625

0.156

Hu Ht Se Tu No Ha

Present condition

6.57

1.624

0.156

Ha Tu Ht Hu No Se

Future condition

6.29

2.611

0.026

Ha Tu No Hl Ht Se

Comparative Analysis of Case Study Villages 225



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