An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia



Table 16.17. Coefficients for correlations between contextual attributes, fishers’ attitudes and performance
indicators for efficiency. Significant correlations indicated with asterisks.

Efficiency Indicators

Member
of village
dev’t group

Religion

Village has
communal
fishing

Villagers
want
fisheries
rules
changed

Acceptable
to bend
rules

Acceptable
to sell
harvest
rights

Communal decision-making

+.096

-.067

-.038

-.152*

+.070

+.087

Ease of entry into the fishery

-.200**

.153*

-.027

+.302**

-.325**

+.120

Control over access to fishery

+.108

.+027

+.197**

-.330**

+.401**

-.026

Compliance with rules

+.095

+.091

-.029

+.199**

-.001

+.231**

Table 16.17. continued

Efficiency Indicators

Elitist decision-
making style
in village

Villagers want
stakeholder
involvement in
decision-making

Economic
score

Villagers
own more
expensive
gear type

Villagers
have
external
income

Communal decision-making

-.182*

+.012

+.210**

+.194**

+.035

Ease of entry into the fishery

+.312**

-.034

-.096

-.127

+.190*

Control over access to fishery

-.183*

+.171*

+.068

+.151*

-.099

Compliance with fishery rules

+.154*

-.294**

-.055

+.010

+.029

Currently, Hulaliu fishers perceive costs to be highest and Nolloth fishers, the lowest (Table
16.18). Nolloth fishers are generally happy with their fishery rules compared to Hulaliu fishers.

Table 16.18. Inter-village differences in perception of ease of entry into the fishery (i.e., negative change
indicates increased costs and more difficult entry).

Ease of entry

Overall average

Anova F

Prob.

Duncan’s post-hoc test

Change over past 15 years

-1.14

1.130

0.346

Ht Hl Se Ha Tu No

Expected change

-1.69

0.860

0.510

Se Hl Ha Ht No Tu

Past condition

8.35

0.899

0.483

Hl Se No Tu Ht Ha

Present condition

6.66

1.813

1.113

Hl Ht Se Tu Ha No

Future condition

5.52

1.359

0.242

Se Hl Ht Tu Ha No

Control over the fishery

Control of fishers over access to the fishery compared to 15 years ago increased significantly
in Nolloth and Haruku, whilst in other villages it remained static (Table 16.19). In the past,
the degree of control over the fishery was comparable for all villages. In Haruku and Nolloth,
where fishers felt the increase in the control over resources, the
kewang is controlling the
resource. There was no significant difference amongst the villages.

Perceptions on control over access were related to gear type in that fishers with more expensive
gears were more positive (Table 16.17). Fishers in villages having communal fishing activities
are also more positive, whereas fishers seeking change in fisheries rules have more negative

Comparative Analysis of Case Study Villages 227



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