An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia



perceptions of control. Fishers who perceived the most negative change in the level of control
were those most adamant about not bending rules, those who felt that decision-making was
by the majority and those who wanted inclusive decision-making.

Table 16.19. Village to village differences in perception of control over marine resources.

Control over fishery

Overall average

Anova F

Prob.

Duncan’s post-hoc test

Change over past 15 years

0.53

1.876

0.101

Ht Hl Tu Se No Ha

Expected change

-0.03

2.878

0.016

Hl Tu Ht Ha Se No

Past condition

6.46

0.364

0.873

No Ha Tu Se Hl Ht

Present condition

6.99

2.361

0.042

Ht Tu Hu No Ha Se

Future condition

6.96

3.479

0.005

Hl Tu Ht Ha No Se

The current situation in Hutumuri is significantly different from Haruku and Seri where fishers
feel there is control over the fishery, i.e., rules and regulations. However, in Seri there is no
enforcement agent, making these replies curious. The
sasi villages and Seri are most optimistic
about the future and perceive an increase in control over the fishery by the government. In
Haruku, fishers talked about the strong role of the
kewang that enforces the rules, while in
Seri, fishers referred to the village government. Fishers in the other villages, and especially in
Hutumuri, complained about the village government and lack of both regulations and
enforcers. In our eyes, an open-access system may seem favorable for the individual fishers,
but apparently, the fishers think government control is important for the protection of the
resources against outsiders1 .

In the future, Hulaliu fishers expect to lose control over access to resources. Apparently, fishers
have little faith in the planned re-installation of
sasi. This future expectation differs significantly
from that of Seri, Nolloth and Haruku fishers who are relatively positive about the degree of
control over the fishery. The fishers seem to relate their degree of control directly to the ability
of the village government or
kewang to enforce the regulations. In other words, the fishers feel
that these institutions represent their interests. The finding of greater perceived control in the
two
sasi villages mirrors the result of the performance analysis performed in 28 villages.

Compliance

Compared to the past, Hulaliu, Tuhaha, Hutumuri and Haruku all perceive reductions in
compliance, while Nolloth and Seri perceived compliance to be stable (Table 16.20). Perception

1 According to Hardin (1968), on the short-term, fishers would have a natural preference for open access because
it allows them to obtain maximum benefits from the resource. To avoid the tragedy of the commons, state or
government, interference (i.e., rules, regulations and enforcement) is necessary to safeguard long-term benefits.
Strikingly, in Maluku, open access is not valued by the fisher population and merely rated as a sign of a weak
government which is unable to protect the resources against either over-exploitation, destruction, or outside
fishers.

228 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia



More intriguing information

1. Alzheimer’s Disease and Herpes Simplex Encephalitis
2. The name is absent
3. Artificial neural networks as models of stimulus control*
4. The name is absent
5. Knowledge and Learning in Complex Urban Renewal Projects; Towards a Process Design
6. The name is absent
7. Wirkung einer Feiertagsbereinigung des Länderfinanzausgleichs: eine empirische Analyse des deutschen Finanzausgleichs
8. CHANGING PRICES, CHANGING CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION
9. AGRIBUSINESS EXECUTIVE EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE: NEW MECHANISMS OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT INVOLVING THE UNIVERSITY, PRIVATE FIRM STAKEHOLDERS AND PUBLIC SECTOR
10. The effect of globalisation on industrial districts in Italy: evidence from the footwear sector
11. The name is absent
12. The Triangular Relationship between the Commission, NRAs and National Courts Revisited
13. Mergers under endogenous minimum quality standard: a note
14. Skills, Partnerships and Tenancy in Sri Lankan Rice Farms
15. GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE WAGE SETTING PROCESS.
16. An Estimated DSGE Model of the Indian Economy.
17. The name is absent
18. The problem of anglophone squint
19. El Mercosur y la integración económica global
20. Has Competition in the Japanese Banking Sector Improved?