An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia

on the change in compliance was related to a fisher’s desire to change rules (Table 16.17).
Oddly, fishers who perceived the change in compliance to be least negative were those who
wanted the rules to change. Another factor was the attitude towards the sale of harvest rights.
Fishers with a negative perception of the change in compliance were those who most strongly
disagreed with the sale of harvest rights to outsiders. Fishers recording the greatest reduction
in compliance also tended to see decision-making as being by consensus or the majority, and
also believed that all stakeholders should be involved in decision-making.

Over 40% of both Nolloth and Seri fishers favor selling harvest rights, while in Hulaliu 90%
are against it. There is no apparent difference in the decision-making process that could explain
their high scores, neither is there a difference amongst the villages in terms of the desirability
of involvement in decision-making of all stakeholders. We are left with the fact that, in Nolloth,
the key factor could be sasi. This conclusion is supported by the finding of greater compliance
in sasi villages in the 28 village survey results.

In the past, compliance was highest in Hutumuri, Tuhaha, and Hulaliu (score >8), which are
the villages where it has reduced most. The greatest reductions are in the villages where sasi
was lost, i.e., Hulaliu and Tuhaha. In Hulaliu, compliance is also low because people neglect
the regulations on blast fishing to express their dissatisfaction with the current village head.
In Tuhaha, economic pressure or the lack of enforcement, or both, caused compliance to decline.

In Nolloth and Seri, where compliance is stable, the situation is different. Seri fishers explained that
Seri has tighter rules, sanctions and control and the government plays an active role. In Nolloth,
compliance was lower during the time of the former village head who is said to have used sasi for his
personal benefits. But now with the new village head, the sanctions are severe and enforcement strict.

In Haruku, the current decline in compliance is influenced by conflicts between the village
head and the kewang. Here also, the fishers who are against the current village head purposely
neglect the rules. In the future, all villages expect compliance to decline, but Haruku, Nolloth
and Seri fishers expect the least decline. In the sasi villages, an incentive for compliance is
adat and enforcement. In Seri, the relative wealth could play a role.

Table 16.20. Differences in perception of compliance to fisheries rules.

Comparative Analysis of Case Study Villages 229

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