Fig. 1 Consumers distribution with and without low-quality merger
Uncovered market Firm 2-3 Firm 1
' With merger
Uncovered
market
I
Firm 3
Firm 2
Firm 1
’ Without
θ.
merger
This merger is profitable, however MQS induces a low quality higher than the
unregulated one by leading to a strong reduction in the differentiation between
the high qualities and a slight increase in the differentiation between the low
qualities. Although such a merger increases the market coverage the regulated
quality is so high that the low-quality firm obtains a negative profit therefore it
would leave the market.
3.3 Monopoly mergers
When firm 3 exists the market the high-quality merger leads to a monopoly in
which the MQS is applied to firm 2. The merger between 1 and 2 leads to:
PM = ! 91 P2 = 1 12 (18)
11 = 0.25, ιi = 0 (19)
II1M = 0.03125 (20)
CSm = 0.03125, Wm = 0.0625 (21)
This merger is clearly profitable and all consumers are worse-off: i) half
consumers are now out of the market, ii) consumers that consume the highest
quality even after the merger pay more for a lower quality. However, if the reg-
ulator did not announce the MQS, then firms would always choose a monopoly
merger. Since the consumers surplus is only affected by the high quality, then
any monopoly (arisen from a three-firm or a bilateral merger) induces the same