to the value that αi assumes (see Proposition 1 and 2), then we need to consider the
following seven cases:
1) In both agendas the SPE outcome is that player 1 demands the entire surplus
(that is, αi < min{b, o}). In this case, player 1 prefers agenda 1 (2 respectively) if
(λ1 - 1)(1 - δ1δ2 - α1δ1(1 - δ2))n∕∩ ɪʌ ∕O9∖
-------------1 + δ δ-------------- > 0(< 0, respect.) (32)
while player 2 prefers Agenda 1 if
α2(1 - δ1)(1 - λ2)
----------——------>> > 0(< 0, respect.) (33)
1+δ1δ2
At the limit for ∆ → 0, expression (32) is positive when λ1 > 1. Then both players
prefer the agenda that sets the most important issue first (e.g., agenda 1 if λ1 > 1
and λ2 < 1).
2) In both agendas the SPE outcome is that player 1 demands the interior solution
of the system of indifference condition (that is, max{b, o} <αi < min{g, q}). In this
case, agenda 1 is preferred by player 1 when (34) below is positive and vice-versa
agenda 2 is favoured when (34) below is negative.
/1 л л 22 ʌ [(λ1λ2 - 1)(1 + δ2)α2(1 - δ1) + λ2(λ1 - 1)(1 - δ1δ2 + α1(δ2 - δ1))] (34)
(1 - δ1δ2)2λ2
Similarly, agenda 1 (2) is preferred by player 2 when (35) below is positive (negative,
respectively):
∕1 2^χ χ 42). [(1 - λ2λ2)(1 + δ1)α1(1 - δ2) + λ1(1 - λ2)(1 - δ1δ2 + α2(δ1 - δ2))] (35)
(1 - δ1δ2)2λ1
21