Constrained School Choice



We distinguish among three cases for the priority ordering fs2 of school s2 with respect
to students i
1, i2, and i3: (i) fs2 (i2) < fs2 (i3) < fs2 (i1), (ii) fs2 (i3) < fs2 (i2) < fs2 (i1),
and (iii) f
s2 (i3) < fs2 (i1) < fs2 (i2). One easily verifies that in each of the cases (i), (ii),
and (iii), the unique stable matching for
P is μ* = γ(P) with μ*(i1) = s1, μ*(i3) = s2,
and μ*(i2) = i2.

Consider Q Q(k)I defined by Qi2 := 0 and Qi := Pi for all i Ii2. One easily
verifies that in each of the cases (i), (ii), and (iii), γ(Q)(i
1) = s2 and γ(Q)(i3) = s1. So,
γ (Q) = μ
*, and hence γ(Q) S (P ). Finally, one easily verifies that Q Eγ (P, k).     

A mechanism is non bossy if no student can maintain his allotment and cause a change
in the other students’ allotments by reporting different preferences.

Definition A.4 Non Bossy Mechanism (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981)
A mechanism
φ is non bossy if for all i I, Qi, Qi Q, and Q-i QI\i, φ(Q'i, Q-i)(i) =
φ(Qi,Q-i)(i) implies φ(Q'i,Q-i) = φ(Qi,Q-i).                                           

Lemma A.5 Let f be an Ergin-acyclic priority structure. Then, γ is non bossy.

Proof Follows from Ergin’s (2002) Theorem 1, (iv) (iii) and proof of (iii) (ii).

Lemma A.6 Let f be an Ergin-acyclic priority structure. Let 2 k m. Then, for any
school choice problem
P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γγ (P, k) are stable, i.e., for
all
Q Eγ(P, k), γ(Q) S(P).

Proof Suppose to the contrary that Q Eγ(P, k) but γ(Q) S(P). So, by Lemma A.2,
there are i, j
I, i = j and s S with γ(Q)(j) = s, sPiγ(Q)(i), and fs(i) < fs(j).

Since γ is strategy-proof in the unconstrained setting (i.e., when the quota equals m,
the number of schools), γ(P
i,Q-i)Riγ(Qi, Q-i). Let Qi := γ(Pi,Q-i)(i). Clearly, Qi
Q
(k). By Lemma A.1, γ(Qi,Q-i)(i) = γ(Pi,Q-i)(i). Hence, γ(Qi, Q-i)Riγ(Qi, Q-i).
If γ(Q
i,Q-i)Piγ(Qi,Q-i), then Q Eγ(P, k), a contradiction. Hence, γ(Qi,Q-i)(i) =
γ(Q
i,Q-i)(i).

By Lemma A.5, γ is non bossy. Hence, γ(Pi, Q-i) = γ(Qi, Q-i) = γ(Q). In particular,
γ(P
i, Q-i)(j) = γ(Q)(j) = s. Since sPiγ(Q)(i) = γ(Pi, Q-i)(i), student i has justified
envy at γ (P
i, Q-i), contradicting γ (Pi, Q-i) S (Pi, Q-i). Hence, γ(Q) S (P ).        

Proof of Theorem 6.5 Proposition 6.1 implies that the game Γγ(P, 1) = Γβ(P, 1)
implements S(P) in Nash equilibria,
i.e., S(P) = Oγ(P, 1). Theorem 5.3 implies that
S (P ) =
Oγ (P, 1) Oγ (P, k). Now Lemmas A.3 and A.6 complete the proof.         

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