Suppose fs1 (i2) < fs1 (i1). Since i1 ∈ γ(Q)(s2), setting i = i2, i′ = i1 , s = s1, s′ = s2,
Is = γ(Q)(s1)∖ip, and Is’ = γ(Q)(s2)∖i1 yields a weak X-cycle.
Suppose now fs1 (i1) < fs1 (i2). If fs1 (i3) < fs1 (i2), then we obtain again a weak X-
cycle by setting i = i3, i' = i2, s = sɪ, s’ = S3, Is = γ(Q)(sι)∖ip, and Is’ = γ(Q)(s3)∖i2.
So, suppose fs1 (i2) < fs1 (i3). By repeating this reasoning with students i4, i5, . . . , ip-1 we
either obtain a weak X -cycle or establish that the priority ordering of school sɪ has the
following form:
fsι : ∙ ∙ ∙ Y(Q) (sɪ) ∙ ∙ ∙ iɪ ∙ ∙ ∙ i2 ∙ ∙ ∙ ip-2 ∙ ∙ ∙ ip-ɪ ∙ ∙ ∙
To deal with the latter case, recall that by construction, ip ∈ γ(Q)(s1) and ip-ɪ ∈ γ(Q)(sp).
So, we obtain a weak X-cycle by setting i = ip, i' = ip-1, s = sɪ, s’ = sp, Is = γ(Q)(s1)∖ip,
and Is’ = γ(Q)(Sp)∖ip-b
(ii) ⇒ (i): Without loss of generality, let students iɪ = i and i2 = i’ and schools sɪ = s
and s2 = s’ be the agents involved in a weak X -cycle. Without loss of generality we may
assume that Is1 = {i3,..., iqs1 +1} and Is2 = {iqs1 +2,..., iqs1 +qs2}. Consider the students’
preferences P given below. (Unacceptable schools are not depicted.)
Pil |
P i2 |
P ... i i3 |
P |
P |
∙∙∙ P _________________iqs-∣ +qs¾ |
^^^⅛1 +qs¾ + 1_____ |
∙ P ггп |
sɪ |
s2 |
sɪ sɪ |
sɪ |
s2 |
s2 s2 | ||
S2 |
sɪ |
Note that for j = qs1 + qs2 + 1, . . . , n, student ij finds all schools unacceptable. One easily
verifies that the distinct matchings
are stable. So, |S(P)| ≥ 2.
iɪ i2 i3
μι =
sɪ s2 sɪ
and
iɪ i2 i3
μs =
s2 sɪ sɪ
iqs1 +ɪ iqs1 +2
sɪ s2
iqs1 +ɪ iqs1 +2
sɪ s2
iqs1 +qs2 iqs1 +qs2 +ɪ
s2 iqs1 +qs2 +ɪ
iqs1 +qs2 iqs1 +qs2 +ɪ
s2 iqs1 +qs2 +ɪ
in
in
in
in
(i) ⇒ (iii): Let P be a school choice problem with Q ∈ Eγ(P, k) such that γ(Q) ∈/ PE(P).
Suppose first that |S(P)| ≥ 2. Then, by (i) ⇒ (ii), f admits a weak X -cycle. So, suppose
|S(P)| = 1. By Lemma A.8, there exists Q ∈ Eγ(P, 1) with γ(Q) = γ(P) =: μ1. If
μ1 ∈ PE(P) then by Theorem 1 of Ergin (2002) f admits an Ergin-cycle, which by
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