Constrained School Choice



Proof Let Q Eψ(P,k). Suppose Q Eψ(P,k'). Then, there is a student i with a
strategy
Qi Q(ki) such that φ(Qi, Q-i)Piφ(Q). Let Qi := φ(Qi,Q-i)(i). Clearly, Qi
Q
(k). By assumption, φ(Qi,Q-i) = φ(Qi,Q-i). So, φ(Qi,Q-i)Piφ(Q), contradicting
Q
Eψ(P, k). Hence, Q Eψ(P, k').                                                   

Proposition B.5 Forany Q QI, any i I, Qi = τ(Q)(i) Q(1) implies τ(Qi,Q-i) =
τ (Q)
. In particular, for any school choice problem P and quotas k < k, Eτ (P, k)
E
τ (P, k).

Proof Let Q QI. Let i I and define Qi := τ(Q)(i) Q(1). Define Q' := (Qi,Q-i).
We have to show that τ(Q
i) = τ(Q). By non bossiness of τ,27 it is sufficient to show
that τ(Q
i)(i) = τ(Q)(i). If τ(Q)(i) = i, then from the definition of the TTC algorithm,
τ(Q
i)(i) = i = τ (Q)(i).

So, suppose τ (Q)(i) =: s S. Suppose to the contrary that τ(Qi)(i) = τ (Q)(i). Then,
since Q
ii = τ (Q)(i) = s, student i remains unassigned under Qi, i.e., τ (Qi)(i) = i. Let
p := σ(Q, i), p
i := σ(Qi, i), and r := min{p, pi}. By Lemma B.3(d), there is a cycle C
with i
C in either G(Q, r) or G(Qi, r) (but not both).

Suppose cycle C is in G(Q, r) but not in G(Qi, r). Since student i is assigned through
cycle C and τ (Q)(i) = s, e(Q, r, i) = s. Since e(Q
i, r, i) = e(Q, r, i) and Qii = τ (Q)(i) = s,
e(Q
i, r, i) = i. Hence, at the beginning of step r of TTC(Qi), school s has no avail-
able seats,
i.e., qQ ,r = 0. By Lemma B.3(b), qQ,r = qQ ,r = 0. So, e(Q,r, i) = s, a
contradiction.

So, cycle C is in G(Qi, r) but not in G(Q, r). If e(Qi, r, i) = s, then τ (Qi)(i) = s,

a contradiction with τ (Qi)(i) = τ (Q)(i). So by Qii = τ (Q)(i) = s, e(Qi, r, i) = i, i.e.,

C = (i) is a self-cycle. Since i V (Q, r) and τ (Q)(i) = s, qsQ,r > 0. By Lemma B.3(b),
q
Q ,r = qQ,r > 0. So, s V(Qi, r). But then from Qi = s, e(Qi, r, i) = s, a contradiction.
We conclude that τ(Q
i)(i) = τ(Q)(i).                                                  

Lemma B.6 Let Q QI. Let v,vi I S, v = vi. Suppose v' P(Q,l,v) at some
step
l of TTC(<Q). Then, σ(Q,v) σ(Q,vi) and [σ(Q,v) = σ(Q,vi) only if v and v' are
removed in the same cycle].

Proof By Observation B.1, each agent in the path from vi to v will keep on pointing to
its (direct) follower at least until the step in which agent v is removed,
i.e., step σ(Q,v).

27Papai’s (2000) main result implies that τ is group strategy-proof. Group strategy-proofness implies
non bossiness.

35



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