Smith and Rawls Share a Room



The next lemma, which appeared in Gusfield and Irving (1989, Lemma 4.3.9), facilitates
the proof of our main result.

Lemma 1 Let μ and μ' be stable matchings. Let i N. Suppose μ'(i) = μ(i) = j for some
j
N. Then, j,μ'(i) = i. Moreover, μ(i) Âi μ'(i) implies μ'(j) Âj μ(j).

Proof By Theorem 1, j,μ'(i) = i. Suppose μ(i) Âi μ,(i) and μ(j) °j μ,(j).  Since

preferences are strict and μ(j) = i = μ'(j), μ(j) Âj μ,(j). Hence, {i, j} is a blocking pair for
μ0 , contradicting stability.                                                                   ¥

Our main result, Theorem 2, extends Theorem 4.3.5 in Gusfield and Irving (1989) from
three to any odd number of stable matchings.

Let μ1 , . . . , μ2k+1 be an odd number of (possibly non-distinct) stable matchings. Let each
agent rank these matchings according to his preferences as explained before (Example 1).
We denote agent
i’s (k + 1)-st ranked match by med{μ1(i), . . . , μ2k+1(i)}.

Theorem 2 Smith and Rawls share a room

Let μ 1,... ,μ2kbe an odd number of (possibly non-distinct) stable matchings. Then, μ* :
N N defined by

μ* (i) := med{μ 1(i),..., μ2k+1(i)} for all i N

is a well-defined stable matching. We call μ* the median matching of μ 1,... ,μ2k.

In the context of the linear programming approach to so-called bistable matching problems,
Sethuraman and Teo (2001, Theorem 3.2) mentioned this result (without proof) as an in-
teresting structural property of stable roommate matchings. Here we provide an elementary
proof.

Proof First, we show that μ* is a well-defined matching, i.e., μ* is of order 2. Let i N
with μ*(i) = i. We have to prove that μ*(μ*(i)) = i. Let j := μ*(i). Without loss of
generality,
μɪ(i) °i μ2(i) °i ■■■ °i μ2k(i) °i μ2k+ι(i).  Then, μ*(i) = μk(i) = j and

μk+1(j) = i. Let S = {μ1, . . . , μ2k+1}. Define

Bi  :=  {μ S I μ °i μk},

wi  :=  {μ s i μ ^i μk}

Bj  :=  {μ S I μ Âj μk}, and

wj  :=  {μ s i μ ^j μk}.

Clearly, {Bi, Wi} and {Bj,Wj} are partitions of S, where possibly Wi = 0 or Bj = 0.

By Lemma 1, Wi Bj. Suppose there exists μ Bj \ Wi. Since Bi U Wi = S, μ Bi.
Thus,
μ Bi Bj. Since μ Bj, μ Âj μk. In particular, since μk(j) = i, μ(j) = i.
Then, since
μ Bi, μ Âi μk. Hence, {i,j} is a blocking pair for μk, contradicting
stability. So,
Wi = Bj. Since {Bi,Wi} and {Bj,Wj} are partitions of S, Bi = Wj. Hence,

Bi

z---------------------------------}|--------------------------

μɪ °i μ2 °i ■ ■ ■ °i μk~i


Wi


Âi

Âj


Wi

■ ■ ■ ~j μk°j {μɪ,..., μk}

|--------------------{z---------------------}

Bi




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