Smith and Rawls Share a Room



In particular, it follows that μ*(j) = μk+1(j). Hence, μ*(μ*(i)) = μ*(j) = μk+1(j) = i.

We now prove that μ* is stable. By definition, μ* is individually rational. Suppose there
is a blocking pair
{i,j} with i = j, i.e., j Âi μ*(i) and i Âj μ*(j). Then, i prefers j to at
least
k + 1 stable matchings in 1,..., μ2k+1}. Similarly, j prefers i to at least k + 1 stable
matchings in
1,... ,μ2k+1}. Hence, for at least one stable matching μ 1,... ,μ2k+1},
j Âi μ(i) and i Âj μ(j), contradicting stability.                                             ¥

We can easily extend the result of Theorem 2 to an even number of stable matchings
(Sethuraman and Teo, 2001, Theorem 3.3).

Corollary 1 Smith and Raw ls (almost) share a room

Let μ 1,... ,μ2k be an even number of (possibly non-distinct) stable matchings. Then, there
exists a stable matching at which each agent is assigned a match of rank k or k
+ 1.

Proof By Theorem 2, the median of the first 2k — 1 stable matchings, i.e., μ* =
med{μ 1,... ,μ2k-1}, is a well-defined and stable matching. Then, for any i N,

...      , 1 1 , * .,1 1 . f k-th ranked match if μ* ( i ) °i μ 2 k ( i );

agent i is matched at μ with his I (k + 1)-st ranked match if μ(i) . μ,2^(i.         b

In the next example we calculate the median matching for three stable matchings and
demonstrate that the “median operator” is not closed, i.e., that the resulting median match-
ing is not always one of the stable matchings that were used to calculate it.

Example 2 An odd number of stable matchings and median matchings

Consider the following roommate problem with 8 agents and preferences as listed in the table
below.

Â1

Â2

Â3

Â4

 5

Â6

Â7

Â8

4

7

2

6

2

1

4

7

2

4

8

2

6

2

6

2

5

6

5

5

4

8

1

5

3

8

4

8

7

3

3

1

8

1

6

3

8

4

5

4

7

5

1

1

3

5

2

6

6

3

7

7

1

7

8

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

There are 5 stable matchings:

μ ι = {{1,3},{2,4},{5,7},{6,8}}

μ2 = {{1,3},{2,7}, {4, 5}, {6, 8}}

μ3 = {{1,7},{2,4},{3, 6}, {5, 8}}

μ 4 = {{1,8},{2,4},{3,6},{5,7}}

μ5 = {{1,8},{2,7},{3, 6}, {4, 5}}

μ4 is the median matching of 1 2 3 4 5 } and of 1 3 5}.                       ъ



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