Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance



fiscal rules, fiscal institutions and fiscal performance 281

A second point is that the awareness of a fiscal problem may not be
permanent. As other problems arise and the deficit returns to normal levels,
the attention to the problems of waste, excessive spending and deficits is
reduced and the tendency for overspending and excessive deficits rises again.
At that point, having better institutions in place than before can be an
important mechanism to preserve the collective memory of the previous
difficulties.

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EICHENGREEN, BARRY and JÜRGEN VON HAGEN, 1996. “Fiscal Policy and
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FELD, LARS P. and GEBHARD KIRCHGÀSSNER, 1999. “Public Debt and Budgetary
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