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Table 5

Probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the means of explanatory variables

	EU	AT	DE	DK	ES	FI	FR	GR	IE	IT	LU	NL	PT	SE	UK
employ	-0.020	-0.302 **	0.006	0.113	-0.153 **	0.115 **	0.012	-0.013	0.013	0.001	0.321 **	0.163	0.037	0.131 *	-0.112
	0.033	0.119	0.061	0.115	0.063	0.055	0.094	0.032	0.077	0.139	0.126	0.100	0.055	0.089	0.110
employ x isb	0.035	0.105	-0.045	-0.118	0.133 **	-0.116	0.000	0.018	0.034	0.064	-0.350 **	-0.083	-0.021	-0.048	0.194 *
	0.030	0.099	0.048	0.102	0.051	0.078	0.035	0.026	0.083	0.166	0.157	0.081	0.028	0.040	0.111
unemploy	0.137 ***	-0.210	0.294 ***	-0.044	0.200 **	0.033	0.100	-0.108	-0.024	-0.239 *	-0.513 **	-0.146	-0.015	-0.048	0.381
	0.047	0.265	0.061	0.151	0.084	0.105	0.124	0.119	0.187	0.089	0.026	0.140	0.311	0.073	0.206
unemploy x isb	-0.047	0.182	-0.141 ***	0.068	-0.121 **	0.062	-0.029	0.078	0.034	0.444 ***	1.349 *	0.039	-0.075	0.074	-0.426 *
	0.031	0.246	0.041	0.115	0.052	0.078	0.063	0.062	0.179	0.130	0.697	0.146	0.205	0.084	0.251
isb	0.000	0.048	0.066 ***	-0.010	-0.016	-0.052 ***	0.018	0.005	-0.034	-0.111	0.231 ***	0.030	-0.010	-0.012	-0.106 **
	0.012	0.056	0.016	0.050	0.025	0.009	0.025	0.006	0.026	0.095	0.061	0.025	0.042	0.013	0.043
relinc	-0.009	-0.013	-0.010	0.000	-0.005	-0.005	-0.016	-0.006	-0.010	-0.029	0.012	-0.008	-0.016	-0.002	-0.002
	0.006	0.014	0.014	0.032	0.029	0.011	0.019	0.013	0.020	0.026	0.036	0.018	0.010	0.008	0.012
ed0	0.128 ***	0.181 *	t	s(1)	0.100	0.040	0.094	0.005	0.220 ***	0.372 **	0.174	-0.036	0.152	f(10)	f(1)
	0.037	0.090			0.084	0.139	0.062	0.049	0.086	0.161	0.180	0.136	0.097
ed1	0.098 ***	0.033	0.114 ***	0.136 ***	0.028	0.005	0.104 **	0.035 *	0.066 **	0.171 ***	0.100 *	0.061 *	-0.017	0.060 ***	0.117 ***
	0.015	0.036	0.037	0.036	0.053	0.018	0.044	0.020	0.032	0.054	0.053	0.033	0.038	0.020	0.025
ed3	-0.124 ***	-0.085 **	-0.111 ***	-0.165 ***	0.036	-0.113 ***	-0.113 ***	-0.146 ***	-0.107 ***	-0.039	-0.088	-0.170 ***	-0.051	-0.063 ***	-0.221 ***
	0.015	0.038	0.019	0.037	0.076	0.034	0.025	0.034	0.032	0.119	0.066	0.027	0.047	0.015	0.031
media	-0.017 ***	0.003	-0.026 *	-0.025 *	0.030	0.006	-0.032 **	-0.018	-0.006	0.001	-0.007	0.007	-0.013	-0.002	-0.038 ***
	0.006	0.011	0.014	0.013	0.022	0.007	0.016	0.013	0.014	0.029	0.015	0.011	0.033	0.002	0.009
friend1	-0.119 ***	-0.146 ***	-0.130 ***	-0.110 ***	-0.182 ***	-0.125 ***	-0.123 ***	-0.080 ***	-0.019	-0.154 ***	0.000	-0.077 ***	-0.142 **	-0.002	-0.078 ***
	0.011	0.034	0.018	0.023	0.041	0.014	0.028	0.024	0.028	0.047	0.063	0.026	0.066	0.024	0.027
friend2	-0.199 ***	-0.324 ***	-0.173 ***	-0.272 ***	-0.315 ***	-0.301 ***	-0.227 ***	-0.148 ***	-0.130 ***	-0.256 **	0.005	-0.085 **	-0.320 ***	-0.030 *	-0.107 ***
	0.018	0.037	0.037	0.058	0.050	0.041	0.038	0.049	0.020	0.055	0.064	0.036	0.041	0.018	0.033
racist	0.129 ***	0.000	0.124 ***	0.120 ***	0.024	0.027 **	0.120 ***	0.018	0.102 ***	0.114 **	-0.001	0.173 ***	0.115 ***	0.107 ***	0.212 ***
	0.012	0.042	0.023	0.018	0.036	0.013	0.035	0.025	0.029	0.054	0.038	0.030	0.028	0.013	0.034
citizen	0.071 **	-0.045	0.127 ***	-0.012	0.317 **	0.135 *	-0.090	0.220 ***	0.149 ***	f(1)	0.070	-0.031	0.071	0.000	0.118
	0.033	0.115	0.025	0.124	0.106	0.077	0.102	0.080	0.039		0.070	0.102	0.234	0.035	0.124
ethnic	0.018	0.099 *	-0.092	0.086	-0.189 **	-0.263 **	0.081	-0.085 ***	-0.104 *	0.513 *	-0.168 *	0.061	0.010	0.020	0.058
	0.033	0.052	0.053	0.113	0.082	0.111	0.090	0.026	0.056	0.208	0.093	0.068	0.092	0.071	0.079
fparent	-0.051 **	0.008	0.016	0.014	0.016	0.077	-0.130 ***	-0.080 **	0.096	-0.101	-0.090	-0.079 *	-0.106	0.028	-0.063
	0.022	0.026	0.038	0.057	0.083	0.057	0.046	0.036	0.075	0.100	0.061	0.045	0.121	0.036	0.048
female	-0.009	-0.002	-0.051 **	-0.063 *	0.031	-0.092 ***	0.036	-0.049 **	-0.040 *	0.031	0.021	-0.047	0.066	-0.020	0.015
	0.013	0.030	0.023	0.034	0.036	0.027	0.042	0.024	0.022	0.046	0.046	0.030	0.043	0.015	0.018
age	0.001 ***	0.005 ***	0.002 **	0.003 ***	0.000	0.007 ***	0.003 ***	0.001 **	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000
	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000
log pseudolikelihood	-10616.928	-677.381	-1185.497	-751.032	-473.164	-1011.149	-661.593	-535.131	-819.780	-270.533	-404.639	-1154.325	-508.906	-594.505	-991.701
McFadden's (1974) LRI	0.110	0.104	0.081	0.084	0.069	0.117	0.118	0.131	0.052	0.098	0.058	0.055	0.089	0.089	0.136
R²p	0.279	0.211	0.092	0.198	0.228	0.280	0.202	0.062	0.023	0.096	0.175	0.068	0.083	0.009	0.272
Sum of PCP	1.341	1.304	1.177	1.264	1.257	1.334	1.295	1.158	1.061	1.171	1.180	1.136	1.170	1.032	1.316
obs.	17640.000______	1123.000______	1979.000______	1197.000______	734.000______	1663.000______	1112.000______	1280.000______	1419.000______	480.000______	620.000	1820.000______	837.000______	1697.000______	1666.000

t All non-missing observations are 0, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.

s(n) n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n) n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.

* 10% ** 5% *** 1%

The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek

(2004: 194-197).

Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti

1 and anti = 0.

Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.

For EU, a further weight adjustment is made to reflect the population size of each country.

Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.

For EU, 13 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.

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